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INTRODUCTION

HE one thing that almost everyone can agree on about federal
criminal law-everyone, that is, outside the employ of the U.S.
Department of Justice-is that it is a mess. If asked to explain why,
most would probably point to the "federalization" of crime-the
fact that Congress has passed so many crimes as to obliterate the
distinction between federal and state criminal law.1 Crime rates rise
and fall, but the federal criminal code always gets larger, more expansive, and more punitive. Much of this unrelenting growth, and
much of federal enforcement activity, has been aimed at activities
that are vigorously prosecuted at the state level, such as violent
'A recent study finds: "There are over 4,000 offenses that carry criminal penalties
in the United States Code. This is a record number, and reflects a one-third increase
since 1980." John S. Baker, Jr., Measuring the Explosive Growth of Federal Crime
Legislation 3 (2004) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). The expansion of federal criminal law is documented in Task Force on the Federalization of
Criminal Law, American Bar Ass'n, The Federalization of Criminal Law 5-14 (1998)
[hereinafter Federalization Task Force]. For a useful overview of the major objections
to federalization, see Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution
Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 893, 90719 (2000).
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crime and drug trafficking. Even in areas outside of traditional
state enforcement, the expansion of the criminal code has seemed
to be driven by politics rather than by a demonstrated need for expanded coverage. In short, the problem with federal criminal law is
that there is too much of it.
The problem with this response is not that it is wrong. Indeed, I
think it is exactly right. The difficulty with the standard arguments
against the federalization of crime is that they point to a disease for
which there is no cure. Framing federalization as a quantitative
problem, as the literature does, leaves only two possible solutions:
either Congress must repeal large portions of the federal criminal
code, or the United States Supreme Court must declare them unconstitutional. No one thinks either prospect is likely, and for good
reason. Congress and federal prosecutors have irresistibly strong
political and institutional incentives to continue expanding the federal criminal code, and the Constitution, as presently interpreted,
has little to say about it.2 To the extent that federalization, understood as a quantitative problem, is what ails federal criminal law,
the prognosis is grim indeed.
If, however, we look past the size of the federal criminal code,
other problems come into focus. This Article will focus on one such
problem, a problem that is qualitative rather than quantitative: the
'Both points are explored in two characteristically insightful articles by Professor
William Stuntz. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
Mich. L. Rev. 505 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological Politics]; William J. Stuntz,
The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107
Yale L.J. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship]. Looking beyond the
"surface politics" of criminal law, Stuntz identifies a "deeper politics, a politics of institutional competition and cooperation, [that] always pushes toward broader liability
rules." Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra, at 510. The Constitution not only fails to
counteract this dynamic; it actually promotes it, albeit unintentionally. Instead of
regulating substantive criminal law (that is, what can and cannot be criminalized, and
how crimes must be defined), the Constitution regulates criminal procedure. This is
perverse, says Stuntz, because "[c]onstitutionalizing procedure, in a world where substantive law and funding [of indigents' criminal defense] are the province of legislatures, may tend to encourage bad substantive law and underfunding." Stuntz, Uneasy
Relationship, supra, at 6. Even under the Rehnquist Court's "New Federalism," the
Court has shown no interest in reining in Congress's repeated incursions into the domain of state criminal law. See Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 35 (2003). Viewed as a
quantitative matter, in short, federalization is a problem without a constitutional
"fix."
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drift of federal criminal law away from the principle that criminal
punishment is founded upon moral blame. Concerns about blameworthiness drive the nearly uniform scholarly condemnation of
federalization. There is the abiding sense among academics and
judges that federal criminal law is out of kilter with any sense of
moral proportion: minor infractions are often treated as serious
crimes, and all crimes, both serious and trivial, are punished with
remarkable severity.'
In other words, federal criminal law does not simply replicate in
federal court outcomes that would otherwise occur in state courts.
Instead, it produces fundamentally different-and fundamentally
worse-results. The claim here is that the qualitative problems associated with federalization, unlike their quantitative counterpart,
are ones that courts can and should solve, and that restoring moral
blameworthiness to its rightful place would make federalization
less objectionable in practice.
Criminal law has traditionally rested on the notion that moral
blameworthiness dictates the outcome of criminal cases. That is to
say, blameworthiness determines two questions: who may be criminally punished and how much punishment may be inflicted on convicted offenders. First, no one should be convicted of a crime
unless his act or omission was morally blameworthy.' A defendant

'Few would disagree with the following assessment by a leading federal criminal
law scholar:
[S]imilarly situated offenders now receive radically different sentences in federal and state court. The mismatch between the wide sweep of the federal
criminal statutes and the relatively limited federal resources-both prosecutorial and judicial-virtually guarantees the continuation of this disparity among
offenders who are similarly situated in every respect except one: whether they
are prosecuted in state or federal court.
Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper
Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 Hastings L.J. 979, 982 (1995); see also,
e.g., Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 2, at 544 (arguing that "federal defendants may well be, on average, less culpable than local defendants").
4 See, e.g., Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal
Sanction 66 (1968) (noting
the "criminal law's traditional emphasis on blameworthiness as a prerequisite to the
imposition of punishment"). For purposes of this Article, the phrase "moral blameworthiness" has its conventional meaning: An act is morally blameworthy, and hence
eligible for criminal punishment, if it violates community standards of morality (in
which case the act is "morally culpable") or is the kind of act that citizens would expect to be illegal (in which case the act is "legally culpable"). See John Shepard Wiley,
Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpre-
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guilty of a blameworthy act or omission deserves to be branded
publicly for his transgression, thereby "convert[ing] into a permanent final judgment what might otherwise be a transient sentiment
[of societal condemnation]."' Second, blameworthiness serves to delimit the amount of punishment that can be imposed upon conviction. To be justified, criminal punishment should be proportional
to the blameworthiness of the defendant's offense; those who are
convicted should be punished in accordance with their degree of
fault.
The thesis of this Article is that proportionality of punishment
has become a casualty of federalization and that the federal courts
helped kill it. The federal courts like to portray themselves as the
victims in the vicious cycle of federalization, left defenseless in the
face of rapacious efforts by Congress and the Department of Justice to use the federal criminal code for their own selfish ends. The
federal judiciary repeatedly complains that its judges are overburdened with criminal cases that belong in state court.6 This is the
story the leading lights in the academy have accepted: Congress is
responsible for politicizing criminal law and making it so broad as
to delegate to federal prosecutors the real lawmaking power in the
federal system. No responsibility is laid at the doorstep of the federal courts This, in my view, lets the federal courts off too easily.
tation, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1021, 1026-29 (1999) (referring to this definition as "conventional").
'2 James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 81-82
(London, Macmillan 1883); see also, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs. 401, 404 (1958) (identifying as the key element of
criminal liability "the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and
justifies its imposition").
6
See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, Congress is Crippling Federal Courts, St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Feb. 16, 1992, at 3B (arguing that the federal judiciary "cannot possibly become federal counterparts of courts of general jurisdiction.., without seriously
undermining their usefulness in performing their traditional role"). Chief Justice
Rehnquist has regularly delivered that urgent message to Congress on behalf of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, to no avail.
'Stuntz, for example, attributes the remarkable breadth and depth of criminal law
(at both the federal and state levels) to "tacit cooperation between prosecutors and
legislators, each of whom benefits from more and broader crimes, and growing marginalization of judges," who "cannot separate these natural allies." Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 2, at 510. See also, e.g., Beale, supra note 3, at 983 (arguing
that the "explosion of new federal criminal statutes.., significantly impairs federal
judges' ability to perform their core constitutional functions in civil cases"); Kathleen
F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 Hast-
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Far from being innocent bystanders in the federalization of
crime, federal judges have been all too willing to construe federal
crimes expansively, without regard to the often dramatic effects
expansive interpretations will have on the punishment federal defendants face. The root of the problem is that the courts view
themselves as having an obligation to ensure that no morally
blameworthy defendant ever slips through the federal cracks. In
focusing on the culpability of the conduct for which prosecutors
seek to convict, courts lose sight of the disproportionality of the
penalties to which their expansive interpretations often expose federal defendants. The inevitable result of how courts approach their
interpretive tasks is a broader and more punitive federal code.
Expansive constructions of criminal statutes have expanded the
number of defendants eligible for prosecution in federal court. This
encourages federal prosecutors, subject to resource constraints, to
shift defendants from state court, where more lenient and more
flexible sentencing policies apply, into federal court, where sentencing is anything but lenient or flexible. Furthermore, given that
federal courts have tended to construe statutes broadly, even when
doing so dramatically increases the punishment for a particular
kind of crime, the punishment for federal defendants will be higher
than it otherwise would have been. Thus, the federal courts have
consistently made federal criminal law broader and more severe
than necessary, and, indeed, broader and more severe than even
Congress may have intended.
Once the responsibility of the courts for the breadth and severity
of federal criminal law is appreciated, it becomes apparent that
there is a ready solution to the problem other than repealing or invalidating whole swaths of the federal code. All that is required is
that courts adjust their interpretive strategies to the realities of a
federalized system of crime and give greater emphasis to the goal
of preventing punishment not justified by moral blameworthiness.
By doing so, courts can help right what is so fundamentally wrong
with federal criminal law.

ings L.J. 1135, 1166 (1995) ("If the federal justice system is to function effectively and
continue to dispense justice, the legislative and executive branches of government
must exercise restraint.").
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This Article will propose three interpretive solutions to disproportionate severity in federal sanctions and the overbreadth of the
federal criminal code. First, courts must specifically take the potential for disproportionate punishment into account in deciding
whether to interpret ambiguous criminal statutes broadly or narrowly. This is particularly vital given contemporary limitations on
sentencing discretion. With little possibility for leniency at the back
end of the criminal process as a safety valve for less culpable defendants convicted of serious crimes, it is imperative that courts
take proportionality concerns into account at the front end of the
process-namely, the interpretive stage.
If courts are to preserve the option of broadly construing federal
crimes, they must pay close attention to the penal consequences of
their interpretive decisions. The penalties available under state law
and other applicable federal statutes can and should be used as the
benchmark for the proportionality inquiry. Criminal statutes
should be interpreted narrowly when an expansive reading would
bring into federal court conduct that otherwise would be subject
only to lesser sanction in state court. A narrow reading is also appropriate when a broad interpretation would take conduct that is
already a crime under one or more federal statutes and bring it
within the ambit of a more severely punished crime. To expand a
more severely punished crime to include conduct for which Congress specifically provided lower penalties elsewhere would risk
disproportionate punishment. The common theme is that courts
should not interpret ambiguous statutes in ways that drive up the
legislatively prescribed punishment for a criminal act.
Unfortunately, as this Article will document, the phenomenal
growth of federal criminal law over the last century does not inspire confidence that courts can reliably discern whether statutes
should be construed broadly or narrowly. Indeed, given how myopically courts focus on culpability to the exclusion of proportionality, there is every reason to think that courts will consistently err
in favor of expanding the reach of ambiguous statutes. This leads
to the second proposed solution.
The second proposal, simply put, is that the courts reinvigorate
the much-maligned "rule of lenity." The rule of lenity requires
courts to construe ambiguous criminal statutes narrowly, in favor
of the defendant. There is nothing new, of course, about the rule of
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lenity, which has been a feature of Anglo-American law for centuries. What is new is the notion that courts should re-ground the
rule in its original purpose of counteracting the severity of criminal
sanctions. Courts, determined to ensure that for every crime of any
significance there will be a remedy (or multiple remedies) in federal court, have consistently opted for severity rather than lenity in
the interpretation of federal crimes. The cure for that problem is a
consistently enforced rule of lenity requiring that courts always
construe ambiguous penal statutes narrowly absent contrary direction from Congress. This solution would restore lenity to the privileged place it held in English common law as a device for countering unjustified severity in criminal sanctions.
Third, courts should treat specific criminal statutes as exclusive
of general ones. Under current law, prosecutors can exploit the redundancy of the federal criminal code to increase the penalty the
defendant faces and, in effect, to redefine crimes. In addition to
turning legislative supremacy in crime definition on its head, this
state of affairs is replete with dangers of disproportionate punishment. When Congress focuses specifically on a concrete class of
criminal behavior, it is more likely that the penalty for that behavior will accurately reflect the seriousness of that behavior. When,
however, Congress does not have a good sense of the range of behaviors that it is criminalizing-as it will not when a crime is defined in vague terms and courts later expand the statute to include
other kinds of behavior that Congress may not have had in mindit is far less likely that the punishment prescribed will "fit" the
crime. Indeed, the opposite is more likely. For these reasons,
courts should adopt an exclusivity principle requiring federal
prosecutors to use the most specific criminal statute applicable to
the criminal act for which they seek to convict.
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows. Part I will
briefly note the role that moral blameworthiness plays on both retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment. Part II will introduce blameworthiness as a two-dimensional concept. The claim is
that the Court does an adequate job of addressing one dimension
of blameworthiness (limiting punishment to morally blameworthy
conduct) but an abysmal job of addressing the other (limiting the
amount of punishment in accordance with blameworthiness). Part
III will document the claim that federal criminal law allows dispro-
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portionately harsh punishment for federal defendants and that the
interpretive strategies employed by the courts have taken a federalized system of crime and made it worse. Part IV will chart the
path to change, identifying a number of interpretive strategies that
must be altered to counteract federalization and its tendency to
sacrifice proportionality. By adopting the suggestions outlined and
defended in Part IV, the federal courts can restore a long overdue
measure of proportionality to federal criminal sanctions without
blazing new and unlikely trails in constitutional law.
I. THE

ROLE OF MORAL BLAMEWORTHINESS IN CRIMINAL LAW

This Part is brief because it covers matters as to which there is
wide agreement among criminal law scholars. There are two general schools of thought on the purposes served by criminal punishment: "retributivism" and "utilitarianism." Retributivism is a deontological theory positing that persons who choose to commit
morally blameworthy acts deserve punishment, and it is their moral
"desert" that justifies punishing them.' In contrast, utilitarians believe that moral blameworthiness does not justify punishment. Instead, punishment may be imposed instrumentally only, where and
to the extent necessary to avert future social harms.9
Moral blameworthiness, all would agree, is central to retributive
theories of punishment, but what about utilitarianism? Utilitarians
do not accept moral blameworthiness as the justification for punishment, but they do not dismiss blameworthiness as irrelevant either. To the contrary, blameworthiness is an "important limiting
principle" in deciding who should and should not be punished on
utilitarian grounds." Utilitarians also agree with retributivists on

'See, e.g., Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law
91 (1997) ("Retributivism is a very straightforward theory of punishment: We are justified in punishing because ... offenders deserve it.").
9
See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in 1 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 1, 83 (John Bowring ed., 1962) ("[AIll
punishment in itself is evil. Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater
evil.").
'0Packer, supra note 4, at 66-67. Even Oliver Wendell Holmes, who viewed crime
prevention as "the chief and only universal purpose of punishment," cautioned that
his claim "[wals not intended to deny that criminal liability.., is founded on blame-
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the need for proportionality." As a recent article explains, both
theories "suggest similar distributions of liability and punishment"
because "a criminal law based on the community's perceptions of
just desert is, from a utilitarian perspective, the more effective
strategy for reducing crime."' 2 Thus, utilitarians should be just as
troubled as retributivists by disproportionately harsh criminal sanctions.

II. PROPORTIONALITY,

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, AND
THE CONSTITUTION

As the prior discussion suggests, moral blameworthiness is a
two-dimensional concept in criminal law theory: it determines both
who can be punished and how much punishment can be imposed
on the guilty. This next Part demonstrates that courts tend to focus
on culpability to the exclusion of proportionality when interpreting
federal criminal statutes. This tendency is strange given that disproportionately severe punishments are just as offensive to notions
of justice, and just as harmful to the moral credibility of the criminal law, as punishing blameless acts. Disproportionately severe
punishment, like punishment of blameless conduct, involves the inworthiness." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 46, 50 (Boston, Little,
Brown & Co. 1881).
" For example, to H.L.A. Hart, the legislature's "guiding principle" in grading offenses should be "proportion," meaning a "commonsense scale of gravity" based on
"very broad judgments both of the relative moral iniquity and harmfulness of different types of offence." H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 25 (1968). At sentencing, proportionality was also to govern. Id.
2 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev.
453, 454 (1997). They go on to explain that "every deviation from a desert distribution
can incrementally undercut the criminal law's moral credibility, which in turn can undercut its ability to help in the creation and internalization of [social] norms and its
power to gain compliance by its moral authority." Id. at 478. See generally Tom R.
Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 178 (1990) (reporting results of a study finding that
people "'obey[] the law if it is legitimate and moral"). To have moral credibility in the
eyes of the public, the criminal law "ought to adopt rules that distribute liability and
punishment according to desert, even if a non-desert distribution appears in the shortrun to offer the possibility of reducing crime." Robinson & Darley, supra, at 477-78.
For interesting discussions of the relevance of blameworthiness to utilitarian theories
of punishment, see Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next,
70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 15-19 (2003); Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and
Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 Yale L.J. 315,
334-46 (1984).
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fliction of punishment that is not morally deserved. Both results,
therefore, are equally to be avoided in a system that seeks to allocate punishment in accordance with blameworthiness.
The Supreme Court has a satisfactory record-lately, at least"of construing federal statutes to exempt morally blameless conduct
from criminal condemnation. Current federal mens rea doctrine is
a good illustration. Under a series of cases dating back to Liparota
v. United States, 14 the Court has determined the mens rea for federal crimes by examining whether heightened mens rea requirements are necessary to avoid convicting what Liparota described as
"innocent conduct."' 5 By "innocence" the Court has in mind not an
inquiry into whether the conduct fits within the literal definition of
a crime, but rather an a priori, unabashedly moral approach to assessing blameworthiness: The question is whether conduct that
would otherwise be a crime deserves punishment. When that question is answered in the negative, the Court uses heightened mens
rea requirements to hard-wire into the definition of the crime judicially enforceable protections for blameless conduct. Thus, in Liparota, the Court held that the government cannot convict a defendant for misuse of food stamps unless he knew that he was
violating federal food-stamp regulations--a tough standard, to be
sure, but one considered vital to ensure that blameless conduct
would escape punishment.
The Court has also taken moral innocence into account in construing the actus reus of federal crimes. A good example is Bronston v. United States." Bronston involved a perjury prosecution for
testimony which, although literally true, was nonresponsive to the
question asked and given with intent to mislead. Even though
Bronston himself was blameworthy-he did not tell the "whole
truth" as witnesses swear to do-the Court narrowly interpreted
" For a striking counterexample, a fitting candidate for inclusion in the federal
criminal law "Hall of Shame," if there ever was one, see United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U.S. 277 (1943) (holding that corporate managers can be convicted for food-anddrug violations by subordinates even if the managers could not have known of such
violations).
"471 U.S. 419 (1985).
15 Id. at 426. For an insightful examination of Liparota and its progeny, see Wiley,
supra note 4, at 1034-53.
6471 U.S. at 433.
" 409 U.S. 352 (1973).
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the perjury statute as exempting literally true testimony from
prosecution. It did so because the "perjury through literal truth"
crime the government was asking the Court to create could ensnare morally blameless witness behavior. 8 The Court understood
that it made no sense to expand the perjury statute to convict
Bronston at the cost of allowing conviction of morally blameless
witnesses in other cases.
Although the Court thus does consider culpability in construing
federal crimes, it earns a failing grade on proportionality issues. As
Part III makes clear, the Court almost invariably construes criminal statutes expansively when the conduct in question is blameworthy, even when doing so threatens punishment in excess of blameworthiness. One might be tempted to say that when culpability and
proportionality conflict, culpability wins. To put the point that way,
however, gives the courts entirely too much credit because it is far
from apparent that courts are even aware that proportionality is a
relevant concern in interpreting federal crimes.
Return to the example of federal mens rea doctrine. The Court
decides mens rea issues by asking whether the conduct is "innocent"'9 or, in a competing formulation, "inevitably nefarious."2 Either way, the point is that the Court is looking at moral blameworthiness as a one-dimensional, binary concept: conduct is either
blameless or blameworthy. The second dimension of blameworthiness, proportionality, receives no mention whatsoever in the mens
rea cases. Not surprisingly, the leading scholarly treatment of these
cases says only that they "shield blameless conduct from criminal
condemnation."'" Once proportionality of punishment is taken into
account, however, it becomes clear that the proper approach is not
just to require culpability but to require enough culpability to make
"The Court explained that "[u]nder the pressures and tensions of interrogation, it is
not uncommon for the most earnest witnesses to give answers that are not entirely
responsive." Id. at 358-59. Similarly, in Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982),
a case involving a massive check-kiting scheme, the Court rejected the government's
contention that writing a bad check constitutes a false statement to a bank, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2000). The Court did so in part because "many people understand a check to represent that the drawer will have sufficient funds deposited in
his account by the time the check clears, or that the drawer will make good the face
value of the draft if it is dishonored by the bank." Williams, 458 U.S. at 286 n.7.
"Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426.
20
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 144 (1994).
21 Wiley, supra note 4, at 1023.
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the sanctions provided by the statute commensurate with the defendant's degree of fault. So far at least, the Court has yet to endorse this principle, which suggests that the Court has simply overlooked proportionality.
This raises the question: Why does the Court give proportionality such short shrift when interpreting federal crimes? Two possible
reasons are apparent. Neither reason justifies ignoring proportionality when interpreting criminal statutes.
One reason is that the Court may regard the concept of proportionality as so malleable as to be incapable of principled judicial
administration. Even though, without question, proportionality is
incapable of precise definition, legislatures routinely apply the
proportionality standard in defining crimes, and judges routinely
apply it at the sentencing stage of every criminal prosecution.22 It is
also the standard that determines whether criminal sanctions are so
extreme as to be unconstitutional and, in the civil context, whether
a punitive damages award is so high as to violate due process."
The most common formulation of the proportionality standard
in the criminal context is that the punishment authorized by the
legislature and imposed by a court must ."fit" the crime committed
by the defendant.24 Although the Court has experienced difficulty
22Even

under the rigid federal sentencing guidelines, proportionality of punishment

is recognized as a goal at sentencing. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1A1.1
(2004) (explaining that the Guidelines aspire to achieve "proportionalityin sentencing
through a system that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct
of different severity"). Many have argued, persuasively in my judgment, that the rigidity of the Guidelines has made true proportionality impossible to achieve. See, e.g.,
Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 901, 906-08 (1991).
23The Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines and Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clauses have been construed to require proportionality in sentencing. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (death penalty); United States v. Bajakajian, 524
U.S. 321 (1998) (fines); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (asset forfeiture);
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (terms of imprisonment). Punitive damages
awards are subject to proportionality review under the Due Process Clauses. See, e.g.,
BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
" See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). As the formulation in the text suggests, inquiries into proportionality call for a
common-sense assessment of the gravity of the offense in light of the penalties
authorized for it and for other crimes. This inquiry is reflected in the Supreme Court's
traditional test of the proportionality of noncapital criminal sanctions. That test directed courts to consider "(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii)
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using proportionality as a standard for assessing the constitutionality of prison terms, the use of proportionality as an interpretive
principle would be far less problematic. To the extent that proportionality has proven problematic in the constitutional context, it is
because subjective standards make it impossible for legislatures to
know what penalties are, and are not, constitutional and because it
is undesirable for the constitutional powers of legislatures to turn
on the subjective views of judges.25
Using proportionality as an interpretive principle would be fundamentally different. It would not diminish legislative power or result in ex ante uncertainty over whether penalties are simply severe
or so severe as to be unconstitutional. As an interpretive principle,
proportionality would merely require courts to err on the side of
leniency if a criminal statute is ambiguous. Congress therefore
would remain free, subject to existing constitutional limitations, to
prescribe whatever penalty it deems appropriate for a criminal act,
provided it does so in clear and unambiguous terms.
Another possible reason why courts fail to consider proportionality in resolving interpretive questions is that they might believe
that the Constitution affords adequate protection against the possibility of disproportionately severe penalties. Such a belief, however, would be mistaken. For all practical purposes, the Court is
out of the business of using the Constitution to regulate the proportionality of prison sentences other than life imprisonment. The
proportionality standard applied in recent Cruel and Unusual Punishments cases is so stringent that, as Professor Karlan notes, it "essentially foreclos[es] relief in contemporary cases."26 If the task of
the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions."
Solem, 463 U.S. at 292. Cases since Solem have held that the Constitution does not
require "'strict proportionality' of punishment and that only "grossly disproportionate" noncapital sanctions are constitutionally suspect. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23-24 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment)).
25For an argument to this effect, see Pamela S. Karlan, "Pricking the Lines":
The
Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 Minn. L. Rev.
880, 882-83 (2004) (arguing that constitutional proportionality review "remains fundamentally subjective").
26
Karlan, supra note 25, at 884. The only case in which the Court invalidated a term
of imprisonment other than life, Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), came
decades before the Court adopted the current stringent standard of gross disproportionality and involved a sentence of "painful as well as hard labor," not just a prison
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preventing disproportionate punishments is left to the Constitution, such punishments will remain with us for a long time-which
makes it essential that courts give proportionality considerations a
prominent place in the interpretation of federal criminal statutes.
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DISPROPORTIONATELY HARSH
FEDERAL SANCTIONS AND THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIME

The goal of proportionality in punishment is under serious pressure in the federal system. The argument here is not the standard
27
complaint that federal punishments are too severe or that the rigidity of the federal sentencing guidelines (and of legislative mandatory minimum sentences) leave district judges no choice but to
impose disproportionately harsh sentences.' This Article, instead,
focuses on a serious threat from another source, one that is actually
within the control of the courts themselves yet has been ignored:
the puzzling practice of courts taking ambiguous criminal statutes
and interpreting them expansively. If, as so many academics and
judges believe, the penalties authorized by Congress are often too
severe, and sentencing discretion is no longer an adequate vehicle
for mitigating the severity of federal punishments, then the worst
thing the federal courts could do would be to construe federal
criminal statutes broadly. To do so, after all, would expand the
reach of the statutes and exacerbate the problem of disproportionately harsh punishments. This might occur in at least two ways.
First, expansive constructions of federal criminal statutes allow
federal prosecutors to shift more offenders from the state system
into the federal system. This shift will often have dramatic penal
consequences because states generally take more lenient, flexible,
29
and creative approaches to sentencing than the federal system.
term. Id. at 366. The Court has even upheld, against proportionality attack, life sentences for crimes other than homicide, both under the current standard and its more
lenient predecessor. See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. 11 (upholding most stringent "threestrikes" law in nation allowing life imprisonment for nonviolent repeat offenders);
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (upholding life with possibility of parole for
habitual offenders).
27See, e.g., Beale, supra note 3, at 997-99.
See, e.g., Kate Stith & Jos6 A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines
in the Federal Courts 4-5, 82-83 (1998); Alschuler, supra note 22, at 906-08, 929-31.
29See Beale, supra note 3, at 998-99 (using drug laws as an illustration that "[t]he
sentences available in a federal prosecution are generally higher than those available
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Second, the willingness of federal courts to interpret criminal statutes broadly creates the danger that defendants guilty of comparatively minor federal crimes will be swept into, and sentenced under, other federal criminal statutes carrying considerably harsher
penalties.
The need for courts to be attentive to the penal effects of their
interpretive decisions is even more imperative given existing federal sentencing policies. Before the advent of the Sentencing
Guidelines, district judges had full discretion to confer leniency on
defendants who, though guilty of an offense, were less culpable
than other offenders. When broad sentencing discretion existed,
expansive interpretations of federal criminal statutes would not
necessarily result in disproportionate punishment even if the
maximum penalty far exceeded those available in state court or
under federal statutes dealing with the same behavior. The stigmatic harm of conviction for a serious crime would remain, of
course, but judges had broad latitude to impose no jail time or a
prison sentence well below the maximum.
The picture became quite different in the 1980s. From that time
forward, Congress has dramatically limited judicial sentencing discretion. In 1984, Congress replaced the traditional federal system
of discretionary, individualized sentencing with a rigid, "one-sizefits-all" system in which judges would derive sentences based on
mechanical point calculations prescribed in mandatory sentencing
guidelines." Those guidelines are no longer binding after United
States v. Booker, but, as the Booker Court predicted, they will unin state court-often ten or even twenty times higher"); Steven D. Clymer, Unequal
Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 643, 674 (1997)
("[S]ome federal laws, most notably those dealing with drug trafficking and weapons
offenses, require imposition of harsh statutory mandatory minimum sentences which
can be as long or longer than the maximum sentences permitted under some state
laws." (footnote omitted)); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?,
63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591, 605, 631-35 (1996) (explaining that states rely more heavily on
expressive alternatives to imprisonment than the federal system); Kay A. Knapp &
Denis J. Hauptly, State and Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Apples and Oranges, 25
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 679, 681-82 (1992) (explaining how most state guidelines are more
flexible and less severe than the federal guidelines). For a useful overview of the ways
in which federal penalties, sentencing policies, and substantive law are more disadvantageous to defendants than state law, see Clymer, supra, at 668-75.
'o Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
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doubtedly "continue to move sentencing in Congress' preferred direction."31 That direction, of course, is away from leniency and
flexibility and toward severity and rigidity.
Moreover, even though the guidelines are no longer binding,
statutory mandatory minimums still exist. There are approximately
one hundred different provisions in the federal criminal code imposing mandatory minimum sentences, and a number of these provisions concern the frequently prosecuted areas of drug and weapons offenses.32 The impact of these provisions is far greater than
their number would suggest. For example, between 1984 and 1991
alone, "nearly 60,000 cases" were sentenced pursuant to mandatory minimums.33 The continued proliferation of mandatory minimums is a significant obstacle to proportionality in sentencing. As
even a defender of tough federal sentences recognizes, "many of
the[] 'horror stories' [in federal sentencing] stem from mandatory

S. Ct. 738, 767 (2005). It is easy to see why. Under Booker, district judges must
do more than simply "consult [the] Guidelines"; they must actually "take them into
account when sentencing." Id. This mandate, coupled with the fact that "the Sentencing Commission remains in place, writing Guidelines," and that appellate courts stand
ready to overturn sentences that they consider "unreasonable," makes it unlikely that
post-Booker sentences will diverge significantly from Guidelines sentences. Id. This is
particularly so given that the Justice Department has announced that it will "actively
seek" sentences in conformity with the Guidelines and report to Congress judges who
impose more lenient sentences. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General James
B. Comey, to All Federal Prosecutors, Department Policies and Procedures Concerning Sentencing 23 (Jan. 28, 2005) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
Although it remains too early to be definitive, the early indications are that district
judges are still generally sentencing within, or close to, the applicable Guidelines
range. See generally United States v. Peach, No. C4-04-003, 2005 WL 352636, at *3
(D.N.D. Feb. 15, 2005) (citing "early data from the Sentencing Commission" finding
that "most federal judges continue to follow the Guidelines" and that the "percentage
of cases sentenced within the Guidelines range post-Booker does not appear to differ
from the past practice in district courts" when the Guidelines were binding). For a detailed statistical analysis of post-Booker sentences, see Memorandum from Linda
Drazga Maxfield, U.S. Sentencing Commission Office of Policy Analysis, to Judge
Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair, and Tim McGrath, Staff Director (Mar. 22, 2005) (on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association).
" See United States Sentencing Commission, Report on Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System 11 & n.40 (1991) [hereinafter Mandatory
Minimum Report].
" Id. at 12.
31125
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minimums in general and from narcotics mandatory minimums in
particular.'34
With these features dominating the federal sentencing landscape, judicial sentencing discretion is no longer a reliable means of
avoiding disproportionately severe punishment. The real sentencing power in the federal system is being wielded, not by judges, but
rather by prosecutors who, for obvious reasons, have strong institutional incentives to prefer severity to leniency. 5 The current repressive approach to sentencing gives added importance to narrowconstruction principles in general, and, in particular, to paying
close attention to the maximum penalty the defendant will face
upon conviction, in determining the scope of federal criminal statutes.
A. Moving State Offenders into the FederalSystem

This Section discusses instances in which broad readings of
criminal statutes have shifted into federal court entire categories of
crimes that could otherwise be prosecuted only in state court,
where considerably lesser punishment would usually apply. For
two reasons, the number of such instances is necessarily small today.
The first reason is the breadth of federal criminal law. There is
enormous overlap between federal and state criminal law, which
means that few categories of crime recognized at the state level will
not be crimes at the federal level as well.36 The second reason is the
depth of federal criminal law. When a type of crime is regulated at
"Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe? A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
(and a Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1017, 1045 (2004).
See generally Mandatory Minimum Report, supra note 32 (recommending repeal of
legislative mandatory minimums in favor of the Guidelines approach).
For an explanation of how limits on judicial sentencing discretion translate
into
largely unbounded prosecutorial power to dictate sentences, see generally Marc L.
Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 Stan. L. Rev.
1211 (2004).
36See Daniel C. Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between Federal and Local
Law Enforcement, in 2 Criminal Justice Organizations 81, 91 (2000) (stating that,
measured in terms of substantive coverage, the overlap between federal and state
criminal codes is "virtually complete"). Richman argues that there are nevertheless
unwritten boundaries between the two systems, emanating from negotiations between
federal and state prosecutors in each jurisdiction as to the kinds of cases that should
"go federal" and those should be handled "stateside." See id. at 91-96.
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the federal level, rarely is there only one applicable statute. The
usual situation is that a multiplicity of federal statutes will be violated by a single criminal act.37 As such, it would be a minor miracle
for someone to violate just one federal criminal statute. Consequently, it will rarely be the case today that whether or not a particular crime can be prosecuted federally will turn on the interpretation of a single federal statute.
That said, however, there are some striking examples. This Section focuses on two of them: sex crimes and bribery involving state
and local officials. In both situations, the courts expansively interpreted the federal statutes at issue, bringing into federal court entire categories of crimes that otherwise would have been prosecuted only in state court. The courts did so even though the federal
penalty was disproportionate to the culpability of the offense as
measured by the maximum penalty under state law or closely
analogous federal statutes, and, in some cases, both.
1. Sex Crimes
The classic historical example of courts moving entire categories
of more leniently prosecuted crimes into federal court is the Mann
Act, also known as the White Slave Traffic Act. As passed in 1910,
the Mann Act made it a federal crime to "transport... in interstate
or foreign commerce... any woman or girl for the purpose 38of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose." As its
colorful title suggests, the Act was aimed at prohibiting "traffick-

" Bribery, for example, is covered by at least seven different federal statutes. There
is the general bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000), but that is only the beginning.
There is also a separate federal program bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000); the
Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000) (which makes it a crime to cross state lines or use
the telephone or mails for purposes of bribery); the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951
(2000) (under which bribery can be prosecuted as a form of extortion, see Evans v.
United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260-61, 268 (1992)); and the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000). Last but not least,
bribery is routinely prosecuted under the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1341, 1343 (2000 & Supp. II 2002) and 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000), on the creative rationale that bribe-taking by public officials defrauds citizens of their intangible right
to honest government. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 195 F.3d 961, 965-66 (7th
Cir. 1999).
" White Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, Pub. L. No. 61-277, § 2, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2000)).
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ing" in females,3 9 but the language Congress used extended far beyond that laudable objective. The question for the Supreme Court
was how broadly the catch-all phrase ("any other immoral purpose") should be interpreted.
On the one hand, the phrase might be read narrowly so that, for
example, it could be applied only in cases having a nexus to organized crime or involving some form of "trafficking" in women. On
the other hand, a number of broader interpretations were also possible. The statute might be read as granting federal agents authority to prosecute illicit sex other than prostitution or "debauchery,"
such as sex among unmarried persons (called "fornication" in the
language of the day) and adultery. At its broadest, the phrase "for
any.., immoral purpose" would allow federal prosecution of any
interstate movement of any female for any purposes-whether related to sex or not-that a jury might condemn as "immoral." ' The
meaning of the Act had decisive implications for the reach of federal criminal law because, apart from the Act, prostitution and
other forms of extramarital sex would not be a federal crime unless
it occurred on a military base or other federal enclave. 1
The Supreme Court interpreted the catch-all phrase broadly. In
Caminetti v. United States,'2 the Court was faced with prosecutions
of men for transporting their lovers across state lines. All were
convicted and jailed for between eighteen months and two years.
Believing the law to be unambiguous, the Court rejected the defendants' contention that the Act was limited to cases of "commercialized vice"; in its view, the catch-all phrase plainly included adul-

39
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 61-47, at 9-10 (1909) ("The legislation is needed to put a
stop to a villainous interstate and international traffic in women and girls. It... aims
solely to prevent panderers and procurers from compelling thousands of women and
girls against their will and desire to enter into ..a life of prostitution.").
' For an elaboration on these and other interpretive possibilities under the Mann
Act, see Peter W. Low, Federal Criminal Law 322 (2d ed. 2003).
"' See infra note 51. Federal enclaves are places within the exclusive jurisdiction of
federal law, and so in those areas federal criminal law operates to the exclusion of
state law. State crimes, however, can often be "borrowed" as the basis for punishing
misconduct on federal enclaves. See Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2000);
Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(b) (2000).
42 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
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tery and fornication.43 The dissent, by contrast, would have limited
the catch-all phrase to commercialized vice."
The consequences of the Caminetti decision were substantial.
For the first time, federal prosecutors were empowered to police
sexual mores nationwide. The Justice Department aggressively
used this new authority over the ensuing decades and, quite ironically given the stated purpose of the law, many Mann Act prosecutions involved private consensual sex, not prostitution.4" This authority remains in place today despite subsequent statutory
revision."
Caminetti had a dramatic effect on the punishment for adultery
and fornication. To be sure, these forms of extramarital sex were
crimes in many states. They were nevertheless typically treated as
minor crimes and, presumably, as crimes that were to be enforced
only rarely, if at all.47 The punishment under the Mann Act was far
Id. at 484-86. Although Caminetti broadly interpreted the catch-all phrase "any
other immoral purpose," it assumed, based on ejusdem generis, that the phrase was
limited to sexual immorality. Id. at 487. Under ejusdem generis, "[wihere general
words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the
preceding specific words." 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction
§ 47:17, at 273-81 (6th ed. 2000).
' 242 U.S. at 502 (McKenna, J., dissenting).
45See David J. Langum, Crossing Over the Line: Legislating Morality and the Mann
Act 139-60 (1994).
46The Mann Act was amended in 1986, just shy of its eightieth anniversary, to make
the statute gender-neutral. The amendment replaced the outmoded concept of "debauchery" and the catch-all phrase with more modern language. See Child Sexual
Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, 100 Stat. 3510, 3511 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2000)) (prohibiting interstate transportation of a person
"with intent that such individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for
which any person can be charged with a criminal offense").
"This can be seen by looking at the penalties that would have been available had
Caminetti and his co-petitioners been prosecuted in state court. The conduct at issue
in the cases consolidated in Caminetti (adultery in two instances and fornication in the
third) took place, or was to take place, in three states: Kansas, Nevada, and Oklahoma. In Kansas, the maximum penalty for adultery at the time was six months in jail;
fornication carried the same penalty but was a crime only if it involved cohabitation
or "open, gross lewdness, or lascivious behavior." See Kan. Gen. Stat. § 3615 (1915).
In Nevada, adultery and fornication were, under similar circumstances, treated as
gross misdemeanors. See Rev. Laws of Nev. § 6460 (1912). In Oklahoma, fornication
does not seem to have been a crime apart from seduction through unkept promises of
marriage; adultery, however, was punishable by up to five years in prison. See Okla.
Stat. art. 31, § 1843 (1921) (seduction), § 1853 (1921) (adultery). The comparative severity of Oklahoma's adultery law was mitigated by the rule that an adultery prosecu43
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more severe: a felony conviction carrying up to five years in prison.
That level of punishment undoubtedly would have been appropriate for the organized prostitution rings at which the Act was aimed.

That penalty, however, was disproportionate for consensual extra-

marital sex in light of the much lower penalties provided for such
conduct under state law. 4
Contrary to the view of the Caminetti majority, the statute did
not require its expansive interpretation. The key to limiting the
statute to more sensible bounds, and thereby averting the danger

of disproportionately harsh punishment for consensual extramari-

tal sex, lay in the principle of ejusdem generis. Prostitution and
"debauchery" involved not just illicit sex, but open and notorious
sexual misconduct. Prostitutes typically plied their trade on the
public streets, in "red-light districts," brothels, or other places said
to be "of ill-repute." Likewise, debauchery, apparently a synonym

for raucous orgies, 9 was, by its nature, difficult to conceal.

The open and notorious nature of prostitution and debauchery

had special implications for the stated legislative objective of pro-

tecting women from being "enslaved" in lives of prostitution.
When the Mann Act was passed, women who had lost their reputa-

tion for "chastity" were social outcasts who, with significantly diminished opportunities for marriage, might well find themselves
destitute. Women in such dire circumstances, the moral crusaders
of the day feared, might be forced into lives of prostitution, a predicament described at that time as a form of "slavery."5 The slidetion could "be commenced and carried on... only by... the husband or wife" of one
of the parties to the adulterous relationship, id. at § 1852, which seems tantamount to
a passive-enforcement policy.
Additionally, the maximum punishments under the Mann Act for adultery and
fornication were substantially in excess of the penalties Congress itself had authorized
for those specific offenses under then-existing federal enclave laws. Under those laws,
which were repealed in 1948, fornication was punishable by no more than six months'
imprisonment, and adultery by up to three years. 18 U.S.C. § 516 (adultery) (repealed
1948); id. § 518 (fornication) (repealed 1948). Caminetti therefore made the federal
penalty for adultery and fornication dependent, not on the act involved, but rather on
where it took place.
49See, e.g., Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 582 (1976) (treating
"orgy" and "debauchery" as synonymous). But cf. Cleveland v. United States, 329
U.S. 14, 17 n.4 (1946) (suggesting in dicta that debauchery might mean "sexual immorality").
5 See generally Langum, supra note 45, at 125-28. On the use of the term "slavery"
in the early 1900s to describe the situation of women trapped in lives of prostitution,
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into-prostitution story breaks down if the woman's sexual affairs
remain private. In that event, the woman's social standing, and her
prospects for marriage, would be unaffected. 5'
If the foregoing reasoning is correct, then the Caminetti Court
could have exempted consensual extramarital sex from the ambit
of the catch-all phrase without doing violence to the statutory text.
Having accepted the notion that ejusdem generis warrants limiting
the catch-all phrase to illicit sex, the Court could have used that
same interpretive principle to limit the statute to the kinds of illicit
sex that were most likely to "enslave" women in lives of prostitution. The question thus arises: Why was the Court so willing to expand the reach of the Mann Act?
The most plausible reason is that the Justices made the mistake
of viewing the case solely in terms of moral blameworthiness.
Given the mores of the early 1900s, extramarital sex would undeniably be morally culpable because such conduct was widely regarded as immoral. It would also be legally culpable because sex
outside of marriage was so thoroughly criminalized at the state
level that a normally socialized person could intuit that it would
likely be illegal. This is of critical importance in understanding the
interpretive posture assumed in Caminetti.
When the conduct the government seeks to prosecute is necessarily wrongful, the usual reasons given for strictly construing
criminal statutes-fair warning, separation of powers, and federalism 52-will often be viewed as having considerably weakened force.
After all, the more deplorable the conduct is, the more likely it is
see Anne M. Coughlin, Of White Slaves and Domestic Hostages, 1 Buff. Crim. L.
Rev. 109, 112 (1997) (explaining the term "white slavery" in terms of the "physical,
psychological, and social shackles that bind prostitute to pimp").
IAs a 1911 government report noted, such a woman "'has her fling and then settles
down to quiet living"' in marriage. Langum, supra note 45, at 128-29 (quoting report
commissioned by the Commissioner of Labor). Of course, the moralists of the day argued that any extramarital sex by women began the more-or-less inevitable slide into
prostitution, id. at 127-28, and the government explicitly asserted in its Caminettibrief
that any woman who engages in extramarital sex is "'a prostitute in the making."' Id.
at 130 (citing Brief for the United States at 17, Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470 (1917) (Nos. 139, 163, 464)). The short answer to this line of argument is that
there is no reason to believe that Congress, which disclaimed any intent to "regulat[e] ... immorality" or "the practice of voluntary prostitution," shared those views.
See H.R. Rep. No. 61-47, at 9-10 (1909).
52See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
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that the defendant should have been on notice that his conduct was
a crime. Also, the likelihood that Congress would have wanted
criminal punishment increases as the culpability of the behavior in
question rises. Moreover, seriously deplorable conduct is highly
likely to be criminalized already under state law, which supports
the existence of fair warning and makes it more likely that Congress would have likewise intended to criminalize the behavior. It
therefore comes as no surprise that the prosecution prevailed in
Caminetti: its interpretation criminalized only wrongful behavior,
and thus the Court saw no reason to limit the statute.
By focusing myopically on the blameworthiness of the behavior
the government sought to prosecute, the Court overlooked another
critical inquiry related to blameworthiness-namely, whether the
penalties for Mann Act violations were proportional to the culpability of extramarital sex. When the proportionality question is
taken into account, the case for a narrow interpretation in Caminetti becomes considerably stronger. As previously shown,53 Mann
Act violations carried significantly heavier penalties than adultery
and fornication did under state law and federal enclave law. This
suggests that Congress did not have extramarital sex in mind when
it passed the Mann Act.
Admittedly, Caminetti is a historical example. The activity that
the Court swept within the Mann Act is no longer prosecuted in
federal court. 4 Nonetheless, the case remains valuable, not just as
an example of the penal consequences that expansive interpretations have produced in the federal system, but also for what it
teaches us about how courts facing contemporary interpretive
questions should approach their task. When broadly interpreting a
criminal statute would substantially increase the penalties that
would otherwise apply, courts would be wise, given the recognized
importance of proportionality of punishment, to insist on clear language from Congress before doing so. As Caminetti vividly illus53
See
54

supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
This was true even before the 1986 amendments narrowed the statute to "illegal"
(as opposed to "immoral") sexual activity. See Langum, supra note 45, at 175-76,
215-16 (noting that, within a decade after Caminetti, Mann Act enforcement efforts
shifted from adultery and fornication to organized prostitution); id. at 242 (explaining
that the Mann Act went "virtually unenforced in noncommercial [that is, nonprostitution] settings, except for rape," from the early 1960s onward).
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trates, courts all too often succumb to the temptation of broadly
construing ambiguous criminal statutes to ensure that no offenders
will slip through the federal cracks. By doing so, courts worsen federalization when they should be counteracting it.
2. State and Local Bribery
Bribery is another illustration of how broad interpretations of
ambiguous criminal statutes have brought into the federal system
categories of crimes that would otherwise have been subject to
lesser sanctions in state court. Although Congress has long criminalized bribery and gratuities offenses involving federal officials,5
bribes involving their state and local counterparts were generally
within the sole province of state criminal law. As far as federal law
was concerned, state and local officials could be prosecuted for
bribery only if the bribes pertained to their participation in federal
programs or performance of official functions on behalf of the federal government. 6 Otherwise, bribery involving affairs of state and
local government was within the sole province of state criminal
law.
The federal courts, however, were quick to fill this gap. From the
1940s until 1987, when the Supreme Court rejected the "intangiblerights doctrine" of mail and wire fraud, 7 the lower courts gave
" See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) (bribery).18 U.S.C. § 666 (2000), covers bribery of
56The federal program bribery statute,
state and local officials if their agency "receives, in any one year period, benefits in
excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan,
guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance." Id. § 666(b). Section
201(a), the bribery statute applicable to federal officials, also applies to state and local
officials to the extent they are acting as agents of the federal government. See Dixson
v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 496 (1984). With the enactment of the Travel Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1952 (2000), and RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000), the coverage of bribery involving state and local affairs was expanded as part of the war on organized
crime.
7
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358-60 (1987). McNally rejected decades
of precedent in the circuits holding that undisclosed corruption, self-dealing, or conflicts of interest by fiduciaries can be prosecuted as mail and wire fraud. Id. The theory of the cases was that such activities "defraud" others of "intangible rights" (such
as an employer's right to the "honest services" of employees or the right of voters and
citizens to have elections and governmental affairs conducted honestly and impartially). See generally Norman Abrams & Sara Sun Beale, Federal Criminal Law and
Its Enforcement 131-33 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that the intangible-rights cases "substantially extended the concept of fraud" because the element of deception was
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prosecutors free reign to use the doctrine to prosecute bribery at
the state and local level.58 This dramatic expansion of the fraud
statutes, though controversial for the reasons that led to its rejection in McNally v. United States,9 was not objectionable from the
standpoint of avoiding disproportionate punishment. The punishment for mail and wire fraud throughout this period was five years,
which, when compared to the usual range of penalties for bribery
under state law and under federal bribery statutes, was hardly excessive. 0
Federal prosecutors evidently thought that five years was not
harsh enough and so, in a stroke of ingenuity, began prosecuting

treated as "satisfied by nondisclosure of dishonest or corrupt actions, and the loss of
an intangible right obviated the necessity to determine whether the scheme caused
any economic loss"). Congress at least partially resurrected the intangible-rights doctrine one year after McNally. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000) (providing that deprivations
of "the intangible right of honest services" can constitute mail and wire fraud). It remains an open question whether § 1346 resurrected just the right to "honest services"
or all of the "intangible rights" recognized prior to McNally. See Cleveland v. United
States,
531 U.S. 12, 19-20 (2000).
8
5 See, e.g., United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974); Shushan
v. United
States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941).
59483 U.S. 350 (1987).
0See infra note 69 (state law); supra note 55 (federal law). The penalty might well
have been disproportionately severe for other crimes punishable as honest-services
mail and wire fraud. Take, for example, receipt of illegal gratuities by state and local
officials. Such conduct does not constitute "bribery," for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 201
(2000), because bribery requires a "quid pro quo," that is, specific intent to give or
receive something of value in exchange for an official act. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. Without the intangible-rights doctrine, state and local gratuities offenses would have been left entirely to state criminal law. The courts, however, have
allowed such offenses to be prosecuted as mail and wire fraud. See generally United
States v. Espy, 989 F. Supp. 17, 26-27 (D.D.C. 1997) (citing cases), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 145 F.3d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The five-year punishment available for
mail and wire fraud prior to 2002 was more than double the penalty that Congress
prescribed for illegal-gratuities offenses involving federal officials. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(c) (2000) (providing a two-year maximum). Later, the courts outdid themselves
by expanding the federal program bribery statute to include illegal-gratuities offenses
by state and local officials, thereby increasing the maximum punishment to ten years
for conduct that would be a five-year offense under mail and wire fraud and, if committed by federal officials, would carry a two-year maximum. See, e.g., United States
v. Crozier, 987 F.2d 893, 898-900 (2d Cir. 1993). For a collection of cases in which
state and local officials were convicted in federal court for gratuities offenses, see
Charles N. Whitaker, Note, Federal Prosecution of State and Local Bribery: Inappropriate Tools and the Need for a Structured Approach, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1617, 1627-28
(1992).
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bribery as a form of "extortion" under the Hobbs Act.6' Proceeding
under the Hobbs Act had several advantages from the standpoint
of federal prosecutors, not the least of which was a severe twentyyear maximum punishment.62 In Evans v. United States, 63 the Supreme Court endorsed decades of lower-court precedent upholding
this creative use of the Hobbs Act.
Evans, a prosecution of a county commissioner who accepted a
bribe in connection with a local zoning matter, involved two questions. The first was whether bribery could constitute extortion. The
second was whether the reference to "inducement" in the statutory
definition of extortion precluded prosecution where the public official passively accepted a bribe. The Court resolved both questions
in favor of the goyernment.
What is so striking about the case is the length to which the majority went to expand the reach of the Hobbs Act. The commonlaw treatment of extortion and bribery, which the majority and dissent debated at length, was unclear at best and thus did not compel
the majority to treat passive acceptance of a bribe as a form of extortion. ' Indeed, the definition of extortion expressly states that
the victim's consent to surrendering money or property must be
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000). The Hobbs Act makes it illegal for anyone to "affect[]
commerce" in any way "by robbery or extortion." Id. § 1951(a). Extortion, in turn, is
defined as "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by
wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official
right." Id. § 1951(b)(2). Official-right extortion, unlike "force, violence, or fear" extortion, can only be committed by a public official or by someone masquerading as a
public official. The first appellate case to endorse the notion that official-right extortion could encompass bribes by public officials was United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d
1205, 1229 (3d Cir. 1972).
62A further advantage of using the Hobbs Act is that the required jurisdictional
nexus is broader than those specified by other federal statutes applicable to such bribery. Unlike those statutes, which specify particular jurisdictional elements that must
be proven in order to convict, see supra note 56, the Hobbs Act allows federal prosecution even when those elements are missing, provided that the government can show
some minimal impact on commerce.
63504 U.S. 255 (1992).
See id. at 269-71; id. at 280-84 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Noting that there were
"substantial arguments" on both sides of that debate, Justice O'Connor sensibly declined to take a position on the relationship between extortion and bribery at common law. Id. at 272 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
To be sure, Congress is presumed to intend common law meaning when it uses common law terms. That presumption, however, only makes sense if the term had an established meaning in the common law.
61
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"induced" by some action on the part of the extortionist-namely,
"induced... under color of official right."65 To say the least, the
requirement of inducement does not easily accommodate passive
acceptance of a bribe.
The inducement requirement does make sense in the broader
context of robbery and the other offenses created by the Hobbs
Act. These offenses, without exception, require active use by the
defendant of wrongful, coercive means to obtain the victim's
money or property.66 Seen in light of these other offenses, it only
made sense to treat extortion under color of official right as involving a different kind of wrongful coercion-namely, the power of
public office-to force people to surrender their money or property.
The majority, however, took a different approach. In its view,
the inducement requirement either did not apply to extortion under color of official right, or, if it did, "the wrongful acceptance of a
bribe establishes all the inducement that the statute requires., 6 No
claim was made (or could have been made) that the text or legislative intent compelled the Evans outcome.
The case for an expansive interpretation was stronger in Evans
than in Caminetti, but not by much. Federal regulation of state and
local corruption can be justified as a check against the possibility
that local law enforcement might itself be corrupt or reluctant to
take on corruption by powerful forces in state and local government. Although that line of reasoning might justify federal regulation of state and local corruption, it does not necessarily justify using the Hobbs Act for that purpose. The Court's decision to do so
in Evans makes sense only from the narrow perspective of making
sure that federal prosecutors can convict any and all culpable defendants. Bribery is, by American standards at least, seriously
wrongful behavior, and so expanding the Hobbs Act to cover bribery poses no danger of convicting morally blameless conduct. The
65 18

U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2).
Robbery requires the defendant to use "actual or threatened force, or violence, or
fear of injury," id. § 1951(b)(1), and extortion requires "force, violence, or fear." Id.
§ 1951(b)(2). The point is even clearer with the other crime created by the Hobbs Act,
for the defendant must "commit[] or threaten[] physical violence to any person or
property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section."
Id. § 1951(a).
67
Evans, 504 U.S. at 266.

2005]

Proportionalityand Federalization

907

absence of such danger, however, is not a sufficient reason for expansively interpreting the Hobbs Act, given the separate, equally
important goal of avoiding disproportionately harsh punishment.
From the perspective of preventing disproportionate punishment, a narrow interpretation would have clearly been the better
course in Evans. Some states treat bribery as a very serious crime,'
but in many other states, the maximum punishment for bribery is
ten years or less.69 The penalty under the Hobbs Act (twenty years)
is thus higher than the penalty for' bribery in many states. In addition, the Hobbs Act penalty is considerably higher than the penalty
Congress authorized for bribery involving federal officials and
state officials acting on behalf of the federal government (fifteen
years) and twice the penalty Congress provided for state and local
officials under the federal program-bribery statute (ten years).
Even if Congress might have viewed bribery at the state and local
level as worse than bribery at the federal level (which is dubious),
there is absolutely no reason to believe that Congress would have
deemed state and local bribery in state and local matters to be so
much worse than state and local bribery in federal programs as to
warrant double the punishment. Evans vividly illustrates the disproportionate punishment-not to mention illogical outcomesthat can result when courts, blinded by the culpability of the conduct for which the government seeks to convict, expand the reach
of ambiguous federal statutes and bring into federal court defen-

68See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 200.04 (McKinney 1999) (twenty-five-year maximum);
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 36.02 (Vernon 2003) (twenty-year maximum). The stiff
twenty-five-year maximum under New York law applies only to bribery schemes in
which the official act involves the investigation, detention, or prosecution of persons
suspected of having committed the most serious grade of felonies. N.Y. Penal Law
§ 200.04. Apart from such bribery schemes, the maximum punishment under New
York law is fifteen years, and even then that maximum applies only if the benefit offered or solicited is "valued in excess of ten thousand dollars." Id. § 200.03. Lesser
are punishable by no more than seven years in prison. Id. § 200.00.
bribes
69
See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2602 (2001) (two and a half years); Cal. Penal Code
§ 67.5 (West 1999) (one-year maximum for misdemeanor bribery and maximum of
three years for felony bribery); D.C. Code Ann. § 22-704 (2001) (five-year maximum);
720 I11.Comp. Stat. 5/33-1 (2003) (seven years); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 118 (West 2004)
(five years); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268A, § 2 (2000) (three years); Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 750.117 (2000) (four years); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 576.010 (2003) (five years); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2921.02 (West 2003) (five years); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-438 (Michie
2001) (ten years).
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dants who otherwise would have been subject to prosecution only
in state court.
B. Excessive Punishmentfor FederalDefendants
The previous Section dealt with the potential for disproportionate punishment that can arise when federal courts broadly construe
criminal statutes to encompass conduct otherwise regulated solely
by state criminal law. This Section deals with the same basic problem in a far more common situation: overlapping federal criminal
statutes prescribing different penalties for a particular kind of
crime. Some degree of redundancy across crimes is inevitable and
unobjectionable. For example, physical attack that can be prosecuted as assault and battery can also constitute homicide if death
results. Although these crimes overlap, they protect victim interests of differing weight, and the penal consequences of prosecuting
a fatal beating as murder instead of assault, though dramatic, are
justified by the fact that death resulted and by the defendant's seriously culpable state of mind in inflicting the beating. Redundancy
thus is not necessarily problematic in and of itself.
What is problematic is allowing prosecutors to exploit the redundancy of federal criminal law to drive up the penalties Congress prescribed for a particular offense. Time and again, courts
have either created or exacerbated redundancies across criminal
statutes by broadly construing generic federal statutes carrying
higher penalties to encompass conduct subject to lower penalties
under federal statutes specifically regulating the type of conduct at
issue. In these contexts, the incremental punishment is determined
solely by an arbitrary factor-namely, the prosecutor's choice of
which statute to invoke°--rather than differences in culpability or

70 In those circumstances, prosecutors will naturally charge the offense that will generate the highest sentence regardless of whether that sanction is commensurate, morally speaking, with the defendant's culpability. Indeed, except in certain limited enumerated circumstances, they are required to do so by Department of Justice policy.
See Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft, to All Federal Prosecutors,
Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges,
and Sentencing 2 (Sept. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft Memo] (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). The fact that federal prosecutors are duty-bound to
pursue the most serious charge refutes any suggestion that prosecutorial discretion is
a sufficient safeguard against disproportionately severe punishment.
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a considered legislative judgment that higher penalties are warranted for that type of behavior.
1. RICO
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO")" was passed in 1970 to give federal prosecutors effective
tools for fighting organized crime. Instead of punishing the commission of discrete crimes, an approach that had proven ineffective
at bringing down organized-crime rings, RICO made it a crime to
use a "pattern of racketeering activity" for certain prohibited purposes (to gain an interest in, or conduct the affairs of, any "enter72
prise" engaged in or affecting commerce). Specifically, RICO
made it a crime to acquire or maintain an interest in an "enter4
prise" through dirty money" or dirty methods, or, in cases where
to
racketeers are already in some sense inside an "enterprise,"
75
activity.
carry out its affairs through a pattern of racketeering
The evident purpose of the statute is clear: to protect "enterprises" against being infiltrated and put to criminal uses by organized crime. That explains why the commission of racketeering
crimes does not violate RICO unless it is directed against an "enterprise" or involves use of an "enterprise" to commit a pattern of
racketeering activity. It also explains the structure of Section 1962:
7118 U.S.C. § 1961-1968 (2000).
72"Racketeering activity" includes

a laundry list of serious federal and state crimes
that were believed to be typical of organized crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Obvious
examples include murder, extortion, bribery, loansharking, drug trafficking, and prostitution. A RICO charge, however, cannot be established simply by the commission of
racketeering activity; the activity must be sufficiently related and continuous to constitute a "pattern." A "pattern of racketeering activity" requires "at least two acts of
racketeering activity ... within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment)." Id.
§ 1961(5). "Enterprise" is defined, unhelpfully, as "includ[ing] any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." Id. § 1961(4).
71See id. § 1962(a) (making it "unlawful for any person who has received any income ...from a pattern of racketeering.., to use or invest... such income... inacquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise").
" See id. § 1962(b) (prohibiting use of "a pattern of racketeering activity.., to acquire or maintain... any interest in or control of any enterprise").
71See id. § 1962(c) (declaring it "unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise.., to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity"). It is also a
crime to conspire to violate subsections (a)-(c) of § 1962. See id. § 1962(d).
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subsections (a), (b), and (d) prohibit racketeers from using or conspiring to use the methods of organized crime, or money generated
through such methods, to gain a toehold in an "enterprise," and
subsection (c) is the completed offense in which the "enterprise"
has already not only been infiltrated but corrupted by being used
to commit a pattern of racketeering activity. The clear implication
is that the "enterprise" was (and, apart from the intervention of
organized crime, would have remained) a legitimate organization
existing for commercial or other lawful purposes.76
The difficulty, as federal prosecutors soon learned, is that a statute limited to preventing the infiltration and corruption of legitimate entities is not the best way to eradicate organized crime.
There is, after all, enough money to be made in purely criminal endeavors so that organized crime will not wither and die if prevented from expanding into legitimate spheres of the national
economy. Accordingly, the Department of Justice ingeniously
reconceptualized the RICO offense.
On this view, RICO (and especially Section 1962(c)) could be
used to prosecute organized crime apart from any efforts to infiltrate legitimate businesses. The theory was that organized crime
families or street gangs could themselves constitute an "enterprise"
and that directing and otherwise participating in the nefarious affairs of such groups itself violates RICO. The theory (which now
represents the dominant approach to RICO) was a considerable

76As

Professor Peter Low explains:
The paradigm offense, as defined in subsection (c), was distorting the business
in which an enterprise could legitimately be engaged (banking, dry cleaning, retail sales, union negotiations, law enforcement) by the use of illegitimate competitive tactics (kickbacks, extortion, bribery, threats, murder). There were two
inchoate offenses designed to prevent this ultimate offense from occurring, defined in subsections (a) and (b). Both were acts of infiltration of a legitimate enterprise.
Low, supra note 40, at 587. This understanding is made explicit in the preamble to
RICO, which declares that RICO was intended to stop the "money and power" of
"organized crime" from being "used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate
business and
labor unions." Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23 (1970). For a detailed
analysis of the legislative history, see Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a
Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 661, 673-80 (1987), which finds not even a
"glimmer" of evidence that RICO "was intended to impose additional criminal sanctions on racketeering acts that did not involve infiltration into legitimate business."
Id. at 680.
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improvement over Congress's original approach. Clearly, RICO
would not have been the success it has been against organized
crime had it been limited to the infiltration of legitimate entities.
The point was not lost on the Supreme Court in United States v.
Turkette.7" The case involved a prosecution in which a street gang
was the RICO enterprise. The Court, over a solo dissent, rejected
the infiltration approach and adopted the prosecution's more expansive approach. The Court found the broader approach preferable because limiting RICO to infiltration would leave "[w]hole
areas of organized criminal activity... beyond the substantive
reach of the enactment."79 It is hard to imagine a clearer declaration that the Court's paramount concern was preventing culpable
behavior (in this case, racketeering by organized crime) from slipping through the federal cracks. The better way to put organized
crime out of business, the Court understood, was to allow prosecutors to "deal with the problem at its very source" instead of forcing
them to await infiltration activity.' Absent anything in RICO preventing illegitimate groups from constituting "enterprises," and
charged by Congress that RICO "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes,"'" the Court wholeheartedly endorsed the reconceptualization of RICO.
"Very few RICO prosecutions involve attempts at infiltration and corruption of
legitimate businesses; the vast majority involve charges under § 1962(c) and related
conspiracy charges based on involvement in purely criminal organizations. See Lynch,
supra note 76, at 662-63. The effectiveness of the reconceptualization of RICO can be
measured in the toll it took on organized crime families nationwide:
By 1989 the steady flow of organized crime RICO prosecutions had resulted in
the convictions of a number of organized crime figures: the bosses of the major
New York La Cosa Nostra families in the "Commission" case; numerous participants in a massive Sicilian heroin importation ring (the "Pizza Connection"
case); and mob bosses in Los Angeles, Cleveland, Kansas City, Philadelphia,
Boston, and Newark. Several of these defendants received prison sentences of
one hundred years.
Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Current RICO Policies of the Department of Justice, 43
Vand. L. Rev. 651, 653 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
"452 U.S. 576 (1981).
Id. at 589.
Id. at 591.
8Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970) (not codified in the U.S. Code).
Although the majority cited the RICO liberal-construction rule, it candidly admitted
that the rule was superfluous to the outcome: "With or without this admonition, we
could not agree... that illegitimate enterprises should be excluded from coverage."
452 U.S. at 587 (emphasis added). The concession was wise because § 904(a) does not
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The result in Turkette may seem unassailable, but only if the issue is viewed solely in terms of culpability. The balance tips in favor of the opposite result when proportionality of punishment is
considered. The effect of Turkette is that crooks who get together
to commit two or more crimes can potentially be convicted under
RICO. That result, though just applied to highly structured entities
like organized crime, creates the danger that garden-variety conspiracies (such as a stick-up man and getaway-car driver who rob a
couple of banks) can be prosecuted as RICO violations. This is so
because a conspiracy is simply an agreement among two or more
people to commit, or assist in the commission of, a crime or series
of crimes. 2 Given the breadth of the predicate crimes that trigger
RICO (particularly mail and wire fraud), Turkette threw open the
door to RICO prosecutions for innumerable conspiracies that otherwise would be prosecuted under ordinary conspiracy law.
The penal effects of allowing RICO to subsume conspiracy law
are significant. Under the federal conspiracy statute, the maximum
penalty for conspiring to commit a federal crime is five years.'
RICO, however, allows up to twenty years in prison and asset forfeiture for each substantive violation, and for conspiracy to violate
RICO, in addition to the punishment for the predicate crimes that
triggered RICO.' The reason for the heavy penalties for RICO
violations is clear: Congress believed that organized crime is, for a
variety of reasons-including its highly structured nature, the vast
economic resources at its disposal, and its tendency to infiltrate legitimate sectors of the economy-far more dangerous than ordinary criminal conspiracies. Allowing ordinary conspiracies to be
charged as RICO violations, however, subjects ordinary conspiraconstitute a reverse-lenity rule requiring RICO to be broadly interpreted whenever
possible. Instead, a broad interpretation is justified only if the "remedial purposes" of
the statute so warrant; otherwise, the rule of lenity should apply. Turkette assumed
that the only pertinent "purpose" of RICO was to eradicate organized crime but, for
reasons to be discussed in the text, the Court overlooked the fact that another purpose of RICO was to provide a special criminal remedy for a distinctive, and distinctively dangerous, criminal threat-namely, that posed by organized crime and similar
entities.
See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 5.03 (Official Draft and Rev. Comments 1985).
83See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000).
"'See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (2000). The twenty-year maximum becomes life imprisonment in the event any racketeering activity committed is punishable by life imprisonment. Id.
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cies to the same draconian penalty that Congress crafted for organized crime. Therefore, Turkette created a serious problem of disproportionate punishment for ordinary conspiratorial behavior."
The danger is illustrated by the well-known case of United States
v. Elliott.' In that case, prosecutors used RICO to tie together into
one "enterprise" six defendants who were or had been involved in
a series of twenty smaller conspiracies with dozens of unindicted
co-conspirators. A few defendants dealt prescription drugs and
other controlled substances, while others stole cars and forged motor-vehicle titles. These conspiracies were ongoing. Also swept into
the RICO "enterprise," however, were a number of discrete conspiracies that had already achieved their criminal objectives: arson
of a nursing home, numerous thefts from interstate commerce,
murder of a government informant, and obstruction of a criminal
trial.
There was only one common player in these different conspiracies: J.C. Hawkins. His co-defendants simply assisted him with particular criminal activities as opportunities arose. Importantly, there
was no evidence that any of his co-conspirators knew that he was
committing crimes with others, much less what those crimes were
and who was involved in their commission. Each defendant knew
only of the crimes in which he personally participated. Neverthe87
less, the defendants were tried en masse and convicted under
RICO.
is fair to say that the Supreme Court has spent the two decades since Turkette
trying to solve the problem of disproportionate punishment that it created. The effort
began in Turkette in dicta suggesting that a valid associated-in-fact "enterprise" requires "evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and ... evidence
that the various associates [comprising the enterprise] function as a continuing unit."
Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583; see also, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993)
(limiting § 1962(c) to make it more difficult to convict outsiders and low-level insiders); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989) (reading
"continuity" and "relationship" requirements into the definition of "pattern");
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985) (suggesting that two acts
of racketeering may not be enough to constitute a "pattern").
'6 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978).
al87Under ordinary conspiracy doctrine, a trial en masse would not have been
a
as
viewed
been
have
would
what
involved
case
the
Elliott,
in
lowed. As noted
"wheel conspiracy," in which a number of participants in smaller conspiracies (the
"spokes") emanated from a single "hub." Id. at 900. Wheel conspiracies are improper
without a "rim" tying the spokes and the hub together into a single wheel; that is to
say, without proof that the members of the smaller conspiracies knew of, or partici85It
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The Elliott panel upheld the use of RICO on these facts. The
panel conceded that the "enterprise" of Hawkins and his codefendants bore closer resemblance to "an amoeba-like infrastructure" than a structured outfit like organized crime.' The lack
of meaningful structure, like the fact that the members of the individual conspiracies did not know about Hawkins's activities with
others, however, did not matter. It was sufficient that all of the defendants constituted part of an associated-in-fact "enterprise" directed by Hawkins operating for a shared criminal objective: "the
desire to make money" through racketeering activity.89 Perhaps
recognizing that, under its approach, any conspiracy involving
racketeering activity might well constitute a RICO violation, the
panel added that the "RICO net" was intended "to trap even the
smallest fish" and that whether the statute produces a "moral imbalance" is "a question whose answer lies in the halls of Congress,
not in the judicial conscience."'
pated in, the other conspiracies. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
RICO changes this feature of conspiracy law by creating an overarching crimeracketeering in connection with a RICO enterprise-uniting into a single enterprise
persons who would otherwise be treated as members of distinct conspiracies. See generally, Elliott, 571 F.2d at 902-03. This aspect of RICO allows the government to join
as co-defendants in a single trial all members of an enterprise, thereby forcing marginal members of the conspiracy who may have committed minor offenses to stand
trial alongside members who were more deeply involved and guilty of far more serious crimes.
Elliot, 571 F.2d at 898; see also id. at 899 (referring to the association as a "myriopod criminal network, loosely connected but connected nonetheless [through Hawkins]").
89
Id. at 898.
Id. at 903, 905. Elliott predated Turkette and its progeny, but the case would almost certainly be decided the same way today. The panel recognized, as Turkette and
H.J. Inc. later ruled, that continuity was essential to a valid RICO charge. See id. at
899 (noting that RICO is not aimed at "'sporadic activity'). The Elliott approach to
identifying the RICO enterprise-isolating the racketeering crimes, identifying who
committed them, and naming those people as an associated-in-fact enterprise-was
exactly the approach endorsed in Turkette. See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583 (stating that
evidence of the enterprise and racketeering activity "may in particular cases coalesce"). To be sure, Turkette did state that some degree of structure, in addition to association in fact, is required in order to have a valid RICO enterprise, id., but the
structure required is easily shown by coordinated action among the defendants. See
generally United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1521 (8th Cir. 1995). Even the most
demanding statement of the structure requirement, United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d
647 (8th Cir. 1982), turns out not to be not very demanding because it can be "demonstrated by proof that a group engaged in a diverse pattern of crimes." Id. at 665. This
language (which naturally begs the question of what constitutes the relevant "group"
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The problem is not as bad as it could have been, but not because
the Court's subsequent efforts to limit RICO have been effective.
Instead, the Department of Justice has been unusually restrained
in its use of RICO. Since 1981, Justice Department regulations
have denied the regional U.S. Attorneys offices the authority to
file RICO charges without prior approval from headquarters in
Washington, D.C.9 The Criminal Division's stated policy is that
"RICO be selectively and uniformly used. '
Although faith in prosecutorial discretion has arguably been
vindicated by extreme restraint in the use of criminal RICO, the
course of action pursued in Turkette was, to say the least, dangerous. It created a serious risk of disproportionately severe punishment for ordinary conspiracies bearing little, if any, resemblance to
organized crime. Though the risk did not fully materialize, there
was no sound reason to take it in the first place. If Turkette had
come out the other way, it is almost certain that Congress would
have come to the Department of Justice's rescue; simply put, the
reconceptualization of RICO as a tool for hitting organized crime
directly at the source was essential if RICO was to be optimally effective against organized crime.
Even if a narrow interpretation of "enterprise" in Turkette
would have been overturned, it hardly follows that such an interpretation would have been pointless. Particularly with a statute as
under RICO) would seem to fit the Fifth Circuit's characterization of the facts in Elli91U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-110.101 (1997).
Such preapproval requirements are understandably rare: in the vast majority of situations, prosecutors in the field are free to file criminal charges without prior notice to,
much less approval from, their departmental superiors in Washington.
92Id. at § 9-110.200; see also id. (explaining that "not every proposed RICO charge
that meets the technical requirements of a RICO violation will be approved" and that
"the Criminal Division will not approve 'imaginative' prosecutions under RICO
which are far afield from the congressional purpose of the RICO statute"). The likely
reason for the Department's extreme restraint in the use of RICO was the fear that
applying a draconian, poorly drafted statute like RICO with the same liberality as
other federal criminal laws might prompt courts to invalidate it. That this fear was justified is shown by the fact that, in H.J. Inc., four Justices who typically side with federal prosecutors came dangerously close to endorsing the view that RICO was facially
void for vagueness. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 254-56 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J.,
O'Connor, J., and Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) ("That the highest Court in
the land has been unable to derive from this statute anything more than today's meager guidance bodes ill for the day when [a vagueness] challenge is presented.").
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innovative and as poorly drafted as RICO, it was worthy of a fresh
look by Congress based on the lessons learned in the early years of
investigations and prosecutions under RICO. In revisiting the statute, Congress would have had the benefit of the Court's concern
that including illegitimate enterprises within RICO would create a
serious danger of disproportionate punishment for ordinary conspiracies-a concern that Congress in all likelihood overlooked
back in 1970 in its single-minded focus on eradicating organized
crime.
When Congress passed RICO, it self-consciously entered uncharted territory. Historically, criminal law has operated by punishing the commission of antisocial acts and omissions, but RICO was
a substantial departure from this model. Instead of punishing the
commission of racketeering activity, RICO makes it a crime, in
Professor (now Judge) Gerald Lynch's phrase, "to be a criminal" 9 3 -or, more fully put, in the business of committing serious
crimes in a business-like (that is, organized) way. Infiltration, in the
original legislative design, was the most important way of showing
that a defendant was in the business of being a criminal: Why
would someone invest, for example, in taking over legitimate businesses or buying off a police department unless he was absolutely
committed to a life of crime on a major scale?
The beauty of the infiltration approach was twofold. First, it
freed Congress from having to define "organized crime," a problem Congress had struggled with in the years leading up to RICO's
enactment. Organized crime, in effect, defined itself through its efforts to infiltrate legitimate spheres of the economy. Second, it
kept most, if not all, ordinary conspiracies, such as the ubiquitous
stick-up man and getaway-car driver who rob a few banks, out of
RICO. Members of ordinary conspiracies typically do not operate
on such a large scale as to need the "cover" of legitimate businesses. Without infiltration activity, the "enterprise" and "pattern"
requirements must do all the work in removing ordinary conspiracies from the ambit of RICO, which they are ill-suited to do." The
disadvantage of the infiltration approach is obvious: it limits RICO
to playing "defense" against organized crime when a more effec-
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Lynch, supra note 76.
, See supra text accompanying notes 78-92.

2005]

Proportionalityand Federalization

917

tive strategy is to play "offense" by hitting organized crime before
it has the chance to infiltrate.
The Court in Turkette could have sent the matter back to Congress by adhering to the originally intended infiltration approach.
Had it done so, the Department of Justice would have certainly
alerted Congress to the disadvantages of the infiltration approach.
To the extent that the Court's opinion clearly articulated the danger that a RICO stripped of infiltration activity could be used simply as a penalty-enhancer for conspiratorial behavior far removed
from organized crime, Congress would have been on notice of this
serious problem. Not only would Congress's deliberations have
been better informed as a result of a reasoned judicial refusal to
reconceptualize RICO, but the chances for an effective legislative
solution to the overbreadth problem would also have been maximized.95 Instead, the Court took the initiative of reconceptualizing
RICO on its own and assumed the difficult task of creating limitations on the concepts of "enterprise" and "pattern" to do the work
that the requirement of infiltration activity was designed to do. In
doing so, the Court eliminated any realistic chance that Congress
would limit RICO on its own.
This outcome was particularly unfortunate. Though the Supreme
Court has struggled, without much success, to limit RICO to acceptable bounds ever since Turkette, it would have been easy for a
Congress apprised of the danger of disproportionate punishment to

" As a matter of political economy, Congress is highly unlikely to amend a statute
solely to narrow its reach. After all, doing so will bring no rewards from a public obsessed with being "tough" on crime and can be expected to provoke opposition by the
Department of Justice, which is the most influential interest group in federal criminal
law. See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 2, at 542-46. The more likely situation for legislative action favorable to criminal defendants is when Congress revisits a
statute in order to make some other change favored by federal prosecutors. For instance, in 1996, Congress passed the False Statements Accountability Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-292, 110 Stat. 3459, in response to a Supreme Court decision holding
that the federal false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, applied only to false statements made to Executive Branch agencies. While amending the statute to extend its
coverage to the other branches of government, Congress extended the materiality requirement applicable to some of the false-statement offenses contained in the former
§ 1001 to those offenses that previously contained no such requirement. By bundling
pro-defendant reforms with statutory changes sought by prosecutors, such reforms
can actually become law even if they might have failed (or not even been introduced)
as stand-alone measures.
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have done so by legislation.96 Now, by virtue of the approach the
Court took in Turkette, there is little chance that Congress will ever
address this important problem. As a result, there is no protection,
other than the good graces of the Department of Justice, against
RICO being used as a penalty enhancement for ordinary conspiratorial behavior-behavior for which Congress prescribed significantly lower penalties under the federal conspiracy statute.
2. Bribery, Gratuities,and Extortion
The application of the Hobbs Act to bribery has already been
discussed at some length and thus can be treated briefly here.97 Recall that in Evans v. United States98 the Supreme Court held that
state and local bribery can constitute extortion under color of law.
That holding produced a significant effect on the punishment of
such bribery, as previously shown. 9 The point to note here is that
Evans brought into the Hobbs Act under the rubric of "bribery" a

example, Congress could have increased the number of predicate acts required for a "pattern" to exist. The closer a case is to the organized-crime side of the
conspiracy spectrum, the easier it will be for prosecutors to prove more than two acts
of racketeering were committed within ten years. An alternative approach would
have been to write into the definition of the RICO offense specific requirements as to
how large an illegitimate enterprise must be, either in terms of personnel or revenues,
to fall within the statute. This is the approach that Congress took in the so-called
"Drug Kingpin" statute. See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2000). One additional alternative among
many would have been for Congress to eliminate from the definition of racketeering
activity crimes, such as mail and wire fraud, that are only tangentially related to organized crime. Congress took this approach in a recently enacted racketeering statute.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (2000) (limiting covered crimes in aid of racketeering to murder,
kidnapping, and other crimes of violence for hire committed at the request of an illegitimate enterprise).
7 See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
9 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
Less dramatic, but troubling nonetheless, is the effect Evans had on the penalty
for bribery involving federal officials. If the federal bribery statute was the sole basis
for prosecuting bribery at the federal level, the maximum punishment available would
be fifteen years. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000). Under Evans, however, bribery involving federal officials can be charged as extortion under color of official right under
the Hobbs Act, which carries a maximum of twenty years' imprisonment. See, e.g.,
United States v. Stephenson, 895 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1990). Allowing federal officials to
be prosecuted for extortion under color of official right under the Hobbs Act produces yet another strange result: the penalty for such extortion by federal officials,
which otherwise would be three years under 18 U.S.C. § 872, increases almost sevenfold to twenty years. See 18 U.S.C. § 872 (2000).
96For
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whole category of behavior that Congress graded as far less culpable than bribery or extortion-namely, illegal-gratuities offenses.
Illegal-gratuities offenses are distinguished from, and far less
culpable than, bribery. Bribery requires a quid pro quo, or a trade
on the officeholder's government position, whereas illegal gratuities may reflect nothing more than an expression of approval of, or
gratitude for, an official act that was already performed in the honest exercise of public office. 1"° The penalties that Congress provided
for bribery and illegal-gratuities offenses clearly reflect the greater
seriousness of the former as compared to the latter: bribery involving federal officials is punishable by up to fifteen years (roughly
eight times the two-year maximum for illegal-gratuities offenses
involving federal officials) and permanent disqualification from future federal office.'' Accordingly, Congress clearly viewed gratuities offenses as far less blameworthy than bribery.
Evans obliterated the distinction between the two crimes and, in
doing so, subjected illegal-gratuities offenses to disproportionate
punishment. While paying lip service to the quid pro quo requirement as a defining feature of bribery, the Evans majority diluted
that requirement. Whereas, under federal bribery statutes, the quid
pro quo requirement mandates proof of "specific intent to give or
receive something of value in exchange for an official act,"'" no
such specific intent is required under Evans. The Evans majority
was explicit on this point: "We hold today that the Government
need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to
which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in
return for official acts."'0 3
The phrasing of the knowledge requirement is key because it
simply restates the mens rea standard for illegal-gratuities offenses
under Section 201(c). As one leading formulation of the elements
of the illegal-gratuities offense put it: "[A] violation of [Section
201(c)] requires the presence of three separate elements: that the
defendant (i) knowingly gave a thing of value; (ii) to a public official or person selected to be a public official; (iii) for or because of
0See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1999) (quotin%18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b) (bribery), 201(c) (gratuities)).
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (bribery) with id. § 201(c) (gratuities).
"2 Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. at 404-O5.
103 504 U.S. at 268.
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any official act performed or to be performed."1" The Evans definition of extortion under color of official right is indistinguishable
from the typical formulation of the illegal-gratuities offense. In
both cases, the specific intent "'to be influenced' in an official act"
necessary for a bribery conviction is conspicuously absent. 5 The
lack of intent to be influenced makes sense for gratuities offenses
because, as one treatise notes, the "gravamen" of such offenses is
"not an intent to be corrupted or influenced, but simply the acceptance of an unauthorized compensation. "' ' It makes no sense,
however, for bribery, the whole point of which is to punish corrupt
bargains in which official acts are traded for private gain.
This nonsensical result is exactly what Evans allows. As lower
courts have recognized, public officials who accept payments from
private parties can be convicted under the Evans standard even absent proof that the officials intended to be influenced in an official
act. ° In other words, Evans allows conviction under the Hobbs
Act not just for bribery, but also for what amounts to an illegalgratuities offense.
The sentencing consequences of Evans are, by any measure,
dramatic. By expanding extortion under color of law to include illegal gratuities, the Court subjected gratuities offenses to the same
punishment as bribery under the Hobbs Act. This is directly contrary to Congress's assessment, as reflected in Section 201, that gra'10United States v. Schaffer, 183 F.3d 833, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
"'Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. at 404.
106Sarah N. Welling et al., Federal Criminal Law and Related Actions: Crimes, Forfeiture, the False Claims Act, and RICO § 7.4, at 216 (1998).
107After surveying the caselaw on this point, the Seventh Circuit concluded:
We therefore join the circuits that require a quid pro quo showing in all [Hobbs
Act] cases [involving payments to public officials]. That said, we also agree...
that the government need not show an explicit agreement, but only that the
payment was made in return for official acts-that the public official understood that as a result of the payment he was expected to exercise particular
kinds of influence on behalf of the payor.
United States v. Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 972 (7th Cir. 2001). Of course, as an evidentiary
matter, intent to be influenced might be inferred from proof that an official accepted a
payment with knowledge that it was offered for, or because of, a future official act,
but absent such an inference such proof alone would be insufficient to convict for
bribery. Under Evans, however, such proof is itself a sufficient basis for conviction,
and lack of intent on the part of the official to be influenced (or the existence of reasonable doubt as to the existence of such intent) is no defense.
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tuities offenses are far less culpable than bribery. Moreover, allowing gratuities offenses to be prosecuted as extortion produces a
ten-fold increase in the maximum punishment Congress provided
under the federal illegal-gratuities statute. Gratuities offenses are
subject to a two-year maximum under Section 201(c) but twenty
years under the Hobbs Act as construed in Evans. These substantial increases in punishment all stem from expanding the Hobbs
Act to include voluntary wealth transfers to public officials instead
of restricting the statute to transfers that are coerced through misuse or misrepresentation of public office.
3. Mail and Wire Fraud
For almost a century, the penalty for mail and wire fraud was no
more than five years' imprisonment. That changed in the wake of
recent corporate accounting scandals. In 2002, Congress increased
the punishment for both offenses to twenty years." The substantial
increase in penalty gives prosecutors powerful new incentives to
use the mail and wire fraud statutes to ratchet up the punishment
offenders would face under other federal fraud statutes.
The mail and wire fraud statutes function as generic antifraud
statutes in the federal system. This is due to two factors. First, the
jurisdictional triggering events under those statutes-use of the
mails and of telephones and other interstate wire facilities-are
ubiquitous. It is difficult to imagine any large-scale fraud (or many
small-scale frauds) that would not involve some use of the mails or
telephones, particularly given how generously the Court has interpreted the jurisdictional requirements for mail and wire fraud."°
Second, the central concept behind both statutes-fraud-is unusually flexible. Fraud under the mail and wire fraud statutes can
encompass conduct that would not fall within traditional commonlaw understandings of "fraud"'1' and that may not violate other
...
See Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 903, 116 Stat. 805 (2002) (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341,
1343). The legislation also made securities fraud a twenty-year offense. See Pub. L.
No. 107-204, § 906, 116 Stat. 806 (2002) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78ff).
1
'OSee, e.g., Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710-11 (1989) (holding that it is
"sufficient for the mailing to be 'incident to an essential part of the scheme,' or 'a step
in [the] plot' (citation omitted)).
'See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000); Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896). In
two post-Durlandcases, the Supreme Court has looked to common law limitations on
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federal antifraud statutes.11' Therefore, the mail and wire fraud
statutes are likely to cover any conduct that falls within other federal antifraud statutes.
This is hardly surprising. Given that the various statutes aim at
the same behavior and differ only in their jurisdictional triggering
events, overlap is inevitable in cases where multiple such events
occur (as they commonly do). Stock transactions may be executed
over the Internet, or by telephone, regular mail, or electronic mail.
This means that those transactions, if fraudulent, can constitute securities fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud. Similarly, claims for reimbursement by the federal Medicare program may be submitted
by mail, and reimbursement can be made via mail or electronic
funds transfers. Consequently, fraudulent Medicare claims can be
prosecuted under a panoply of federal criminal statutes: in addition
to mail and wire fraud, statutes prohibiting health-care fraud, the
submission of false claims to federal agencies, and conspiracies to
defraud the United States all potentially apply. Redundancies such
as these across crimes are commonplace throughout the federal
system.
Therein lies the danger of disproportionate punishment for
fraudulent behavior under the 2002 legislation. Few federal antifraud statutes carry penalties as severe as mail and wire fraud now
do, and a good number of those statutes provide for considerably
lower penalties. Conspiracies to defraud the United States are punishable by five years maximum, as is the filing of false or fraudulent

the concept of fraud. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (holding that materiality is an implied element in prosecutions for mail fraud); McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987) (holding that the object of a scheme to defraud must be
acquisition of money or property, as opposed to intangible rights). In neither case,
however, did the Court repudiate the holding in Durland that the mail fraud statute is
not limited to common-law understandings of fraud.
...
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), is the best example. The case involved securities, mail, and wire fraud charges premised upon a scheme by a newspaper reporter and others to misappropriate from the Wall Street Journal and trade
upon confidential pre-publication information about publicly traded companies. It
was unclear at the time whether such behavior constituted securities fraud (because
the victim of the fraud, the newspaper, did not trade in the affected securities), and
the Carpenter Court evenly divided on that question. Id. at 24. The fact that the defendants' securities scheme might not violate the securities laws did not prevent the
Court from concluding, unanimously, that the scheme fell within the mail and wire
fraud statutes. Id. at 28.
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claims with federal agencies.'1 2 The maximum punishment for
credit-card fraud and health-care fraud is ten years."3 In all of these
cases, prosecutors can, simply by charging mail and wire fraud violations in addition to, or in lieu of, other antifraud laws, drive up
the maximum punishment defendants would otherwise face under
federal statutes addressing their specific kind of fraudulent activity.
Unlike the other instances of disproportionate punishment discussed in the previous Sections of this Part, the pervasive problem
of overlapping federal crimes was not, strictly speaking, created by
the federal courts. The prime culprit is Congress, and the root of
the problem is that there are just too many different federal statutes on the books regulating fraud-or, at least, so it would appear.
On closer inspection, however, this is yet another example of
courts taking a bad situation created by Congress and making it
worse. The multiplicity of overlapping crimes is not problematic in
itself, nor is it necessarily problematic that such overlapping crimes
may be defined or punished differently.
Major problems have arisen in the context of overlapping criminal statutes because of how courts have responded to this situation.
Where such overlap exists, courts have held that, absent either a
double-jeopardy violation or specific legislative intent to make a
particular crime exclusive of other crimes, prosecutors are free to
pick and choose among the applicable statutes as they see fit."' As
with so many other features of federal criminal law, the redundancy of the federal criminal code translates into more lawmaking
power-and more sentencing power-for prosecutors. Prosecutors
can use their power to select the applicable charge from among
overlapping statutes to increase the punishment that the defendant

"' See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2000) (false claims); id. § 371 (2000) (conspiracy).
113 See 15 U.S.C. § 1644 (2000) (credit-card fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2000) (healthcare fraud).
.'The Supreme Court has "long recognized that when an act violates more than
one criminal statute, the Government may prosecute under either so long as it does
not discriminate against any class of defendants." United States v. Batchelder, 442
U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979). This nonexclusivity rule has been applied to the federal fraud
statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir.
1982) (holding that the False Claims Act, 18 U.S.C. § 287, does not impliedly preclude
use of the later-enacted mail and wire fraud statutes). Multiple convictions do not violate double jeopardy as long as each crime requires an element that the other does
not. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
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will face. They can also use strategic charge-selection to evade express limitations in the definition of crimes.
A few examples may help to illustrate the point. Congress made
credit-card fraud a serious crime, punishable by up to ten years in
prison. Now that mail and wire fraud are twenty-year offenses, allowing those crimes to be used for frauds involving credit cards will
double the maximum penalty that Congress specifically prescribed
for credit-card fraud. The penal consequences are even more staggering when it comes to the use of mail and wire fraud to prosecute
the submission of false claims to federal agencies: the maximum
penalty increases fourfold, from five to twenty years. If the ideal of
avoiding disproportionate punishment is to mean anything, such
dramatic increases in criminal penalties should turn on the culpability of the offense committed by the defendant, not the statute
the prosecutor chooses to employ in a particular case.
Credit-card fraud is an example from the literature... illustrating
how mail and wire fraud can be used to redefine the crime of
fraudulent use of credit cards. The credit-card fraud statute does
not permit federal prosecution unless the fraud exceeds a specific
monetary amount."6 Presumably, Congress imposed a monetary
limit to prevent prosecutors from making a "federal case" out of
small-scale frauds involving credit cards. Credit-card authorization
and billing, however, invariably involve some use of the mails and
interstate wires. As such, prosecutors can evade the monetary limit
imposed by Congress by prosecuting fraudulent uses of credit cards
below the limit as mail or wire fraud instead of credit-card fraud.
It is not immediately obvious why courts have been so willing to
allow prosecutors to exploit the redundancies in federal criminal
law, in effect, to redefine crimes and override congressional choices
as to the proper penalty for a criminal act. A bedrock principle of
American criminal justice is legislative supremacy-the idea that it
is for legislatures, not courts or law enforcement, to define
crimes."7 From the vantage point of legislative supremacy, the
113See, e.g., Todd E. Molz, Note, The Mail Fraud Statute: An Argument for Repeal
by Implication, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 983, 985-86 (1997).
"'The current monetary limit for most purposes is one thousand dollars in any
given year. See 15 U.S.C. § 1644(a), (d), (f) (2000).
W7 This notion inheres in the "principle of legality."
As one leading treatment summarizes the concept: "The principle of legality.., stands for the desirability in princi-
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courts' hands-off approach to redundancy in criminal law seems
profoundly misguided. If Congress is to be supreme in matters of
federal criminal law, why should prosecutors be allowed to exploit
the existence of overlapping crimes to override specific congressional policy judgments about the scope of, or proper penalty for,
particular crimes? The existence of separate criminal statutes indicates an intent for each such statute to be an independent basis for
a federal conviction. Allowing prosecutors to take advantage of
overlapping statutes to prosecute behavior that Congress specifically exempted from criminal sanction in other statutes and drive
up the penalties that Congress specifically prescribed for particular
criminal acts is quite another matter.
C. Synthesis
The lesson of this Section is that federal courts are too often
blind to the impact of their interpretive decisions on the punishment criminal defendants will face upon conviction. This is so because, in deciding whether to construe criminal statutes broadly or
narrowly, courts tend to give undue emphasis to whether or not the
conduct the government seeks to prosecute is morally blameworthy. Where the conduct in question is blameworthy, courts are
likely to construe a criminal statute broadly in order to minimize
the possibility that culpable defendants will slip through the cracks
of a particular statute or of federal criminal law as a whole.
It is easy to see why this is so. Courts address interpretive questions in the context of an actual criminal prosecution. As such, they
will be primarily concerned with making sure the case before them
comes out "right"-which, in the case of morallya blameworthy
18
mean conviction.
conduct, will almost invariably be taken to
pie of advance legislative specification of criminal misconduct." John Calvin Jeffries,
Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. 189,
190 (1985). Although legality is sometimes described as merely as a rejection of judicial crime-creation, the principle reflects the broader notion, in Professor Jeffries's
words, that only legislatures are "politically competent to define crime." Id. See also,
e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) ("[B]ecause criminal punishment
usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures.., should
define criminal activity.").
the range of po18 That is why federal mens rea doctrine forces courts to scrutinize
tential applications of criminal statutes. See infra note 128. Because courts see only
the criminal cases that prosecutors want them to see--other cases never get filed or

926

VirginiaLaw Review

[Vol. 91:879

Thus, separation of powers, federalism, and guaranteeing fair
warning to defendants, the usual reasons for strictly construing
criminal statutes, 119 all take a back seat in the usual case to assisting
prosecutors in convicting blameworthy defendants.
In other words, the courts' aversion to letting blameworthy conduct slip through the federal cracks has dramatically reversed the
lenity presumption. The operative presumption in criminal cases
today is that whenever the conduct in question is morally blameworthy, statutes should be broadly construed, in favor of the prosecution, unless the defendant's interpretation is compelled by the
20
statute.'

Bluntly put, unless the statutory text compels the oppo-

site result, the prosecution should always win unless there is a
compelling reason (such as plain text or moral blamelessness) to
rule in favor of the defendant. The rule of lenity, in short, has been
converted from a rule about the proper locus of lawmaking power
in the area of crime into what can only be described as a "rule of
severity."
However sensible a rule of severity might seem in the abstract, it
has serious problems of its own. First, it worsens the problem of
federalization. A rule that criminal statutes should be broadly interpreted increases the amount of behavior that can be prosecuted
end in guilty pleas-focusing on the case at hand can lead courts to miss the bigger
picture, including the potential for disproportionate punishment. Evans is a nice illustration: the Court was so determined to expand the Hobbs Act to cover bribery that it
overlooked the fact that its decision increased tenfold the penalty for gratuities offenses and considerably increased the penalty for bribery. See supra notes 61-69 and
accompanying text.
"' See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
120 Contrast that presumption with the following statement
of lenity: "when there are
two rational readings of a criminal statute.., we are to choose the harsher only when
Congress has spoken in clear and definite language." McNally v. United States, 483
U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987). The demise of lenity can be seen in a number of appellate
decisions specifically declaring that certain criminal statutes should be read broadly.
See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985) (RICO); United
States v. Jackson, 345 F.3d 638, 646 (8th Cir. 2003) (Continuing Criminal Enterprises);
United States v. Colton, 231 F.3d 890, 903 (4th Cir. 2000) (bank fraud). The source of
this doctrinal confusion is the Supreme Court. While sometimes faithfully applying
the rule of lenity, the Court has more often either ignored lenity or dismissed it as a
principle applicable only when legislative history and other interpretive principles
cannot give meaning to an ambiguous statute. See, e.g., Holloway v. United States,
526 U.S. 1, 12 n.14 (1999). For a good descriptive account of the Supreme Court's
schizophrenic case law on lenity, see Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common
Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345, 384-89.
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in federal court. Under this rule, federal criminal law reaches not
only the considerable amount of behavior that clearly falls within
the terms of federal criminal statutes, but also the even larger universe of blameworthy behavior that can conceivably be made to fit
within a federal crime.12' As Evans shows, it also increases redundancies across federal statutes. Federal statutes specifically criminalize bribery involving state and local officials only when there is
a nexus between their activities and federal functions or programs,
but Evans created an overlapping remedy under the Hobbs Act
that can be used (and is used) to sidestep federal bribery statutes
and bring into federal court state and local bribery with no federal
nexus. The rule of severity thus translates into a broader and
deeper federal criminal code.
Second, a broad-interpretation rule increases incentives for federal prosecutors to file charges in certain cases that otherwise
might not be pursued in federal court. The key to understanding
this point is recognizing that the courts' penchant for broad interpretations increases both the likelihood of conviction and (in many
cases) the potential punishment. If courts were less willing to expand criminal statutes, "visionary" prosecutions, such as Turkette
and the "intangible rights" cases, which are not firmly grounded in
existing statutes would be unlikely to succeed. The odds of success
for the prosecution are considerably better-and the prosecutor's
power to extract guilty pleas from defendants even greater-when
courts stand ready to expand criminal statutes. Prosecutors can
bring visionary prosecutions secure in the knowledge that courts
will usually stretch existing statutes if the prosecutor targets
blameworthy defendants, and so there is every reason to expect
more of those prosecutions to be brought federally. As Professor
"' "Intangible-rights" mail and wire fraud is a case in point. To say the least, it was
far from clear from the face of the mail and wire fraud statutes that they covered, for
example, corruption, political patronage, conflicts of interest, or breaches of fiduciary
duty. Those results came about only as a result of expansive interpretations of those
laws by prosecutors and courts: such misdeeds (and more) were imaginatively recast
as schemes to deprive people of various "intangible rights," including the right to
"honest services" and "good government." See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., From
Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and
the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 117 (1981). Although Congress subsequently ratified to some extent the intangible-rights doctrine,
the only intangible right that is clearly reinstated is the "intangible right of honest services." 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).

928

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 91:879

John Jeffries has said: "Where judges stand ready to create new
crimes (by attributing new meanings to pre-existing rubrics of
common-law criminalization), police and prosecutors will bring
them new crimes to create."'22
The willingness of the courts to construe statutes in ways that
dramatically increase the penalty for the crime is another source of
increased incentives to bring more of certain kinds of cases in federal court. When courts broadly construe criminal statutes carrying
severe punishment (such as the Hobbs Act) to apply to conduct
that is more leniently punished under other statutes, they drive up
the potential punishment in those cases. Holding the likelihood of
conviction constant, an increase in the potential punishment will
tend to make a prosecution more attractive than it otherwise would
have been,123 particularly in cases where the federal penalty is considerably higher than the penalties available under state law. In
such circumstances, state law enforcement will have an incentive to
refer state offenders for federal prosecution, and the need to cultivate good relations with state authorities may incline federal
prosecutors to accept such referrals."' Ironically, then, by straining
to avoid the potential that blameworthy defendants will slip
through the federal cracks, the federal courts are unintentionally
making the problem of federalization worse.
Finally, the courts' willingness to construe criminal statutes
broadly simply trades one blameworthiness problem (some culpable offenders potentially slipping through the federal cracks) for
another (allowing punishment in excess of culpability). The trade is
122Jeffries,

supra note 117, at 222-23.
argument assumes, of course, that prosecutors try to maximize the deterrence they get from their scarce prosecutorial resources, a common assumption
among law-and-economics scholars. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. Legal Stud. 289, 295-96 (1983). It would be "simplistic" to assume that "conviction maximization" is the driving force behind all realworld prosecutorial charging decisions. Daniel C. Richman, Prosecutors and Their
Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 751 (2004). Nevertheless, given that two key factors in deciding whether or not to prosecute will be the
likelihood of conviction and the potential punishment, any increase in those factors
will tend to make prosecution more likely.
2'A local police detective explained how his office decides which cases
to send to
federal or state court in these terms: "'[I]t's like buying a car: we're going to the place
we feel we can get the best deal."' Richman, supra note 36, at 95. On the relationship
between federal and state law enforcers and the need of federal authorities for state
cooperation, see id. at 91-96.
3 The
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a foolhardy one. Given the breadth and redundancy of federal
criminal law, the risk that seriously culpable offenders will slip
completely through the federal cracks is small, perhaps vanishingly
unso.12' The far more likely prospect is that an inability to convict
der one federal statute will leave ample room for conviction under
other federal statutes. Thus, a policy of interpreting statutes
broadly is not necessary to guarantee that federal criminal law will
reach seriously culpable behavior.
Even if it were, however, state criminal law would be the obvious fall-back for bad behavior that manages to slip through the
federal cracks or receives disproportionately light punishment under federal law. State criminal law must be even broader than federal criminal law because state courts are the front lines in the war
against crime.126 Moreover, state crimes, unlike their federal counterparts, are typically not limited in their application by jurisdictional triggering events. State crimes are usually defined simply in
terms of the prohibited acts, without reference to the jurisdictional
events, such as crossing state lines, using the mails, or affecting
commerce, on which federal criminal jurisdiction usually depends.
outFor these reasons, almost any federal crime that takes place
1
Given
2
court.
side of federal enclaves can be prosecuted in state
Needless to say, there are any number of state offenses that cannot be prosecuted
in federal court unless they occur on federal enclaves. Some of these offenses may be
minor (such as littering and traffic infractions), but others may be serious (such as
drunk driving). These crimes will indeed fall through the federal cracks, but that is
only because there are no federal statutes even remotely addressing such matters,
which Congress has evidently chosen to leave to state law. The point in the text is
that, within the category of crimes that are serious and that federal prosecutors would
be interested in prosecuting federally, the risk of offenders slipping completely
through the federal cracks is quite small.
Consider the following data from 1998: whereas 78,172 defendants were charged
.26
in federal court, the number stood at 14.6 million in state courts nationwide. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, A Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics 2 (2000); Examining the Work of the State Courts, 1998: A National
Perspective from the Court Statistics Project 65-74 (B. Ostrom & N. Kauder eds.,
1999).
a
7This can be seen by examining existing patterns of federal prosecutions. Only
..
in
matters
other
or
immigration
involve
prosecutions
federal
of
small percentage
which federal jurisdiction is exclusive. The overwhelming majority involves fraud,
drugs, and street crimes of the sort that every state prosecutes. See U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n, 2002 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics 11, 11 fig. A. Of course,
federal prosecutors cannot compel state prosecutors to pursue state-court charges, but
there would almost never be any need for such compulsion. As Daniel Richman has
1.5
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the availability of state criminal law, a policy of broadly interpreting federal criminal statutes is not necessary to ensure that culpable defendants receive criminal punishment.
Moreover, even if it is essential to make sure that federal prosecutors can convict all or virtually all culpable defendants, it makes
no sense to do so in a way that threatens disproportionately harsh
punishment. In a system, such as ours, that is based on limiting
guilt and punishment in accordance with moral blameworthiness,
imposing disproportionately severe penalties is not an acceptable
choice. If disproportionate punishment is the price to ensure that
culpable defendants do not slip through the federal cracks, then the
price is simply too high.
IV. HOW TO RESTORE

PROPORTIONALITY TO FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAW (AND COUNTERACT FEDERALIZATION IN THE PROCESS)

What is the solution to the problems identified in this Article? It
is for the courts to interpret criminal statutes with keen sensitivity
to the role that moral blameworthiness must play in delimiting the
amount of punishment that is imposed on convicted offenders.
Proportionality of punishment should no longer be treated as optional or, even worse, irrelevant in federal cases; it is essential to
the moral credibility of the criminal law. Courts cannot continue to
expand crimes to ensure that nontrivial culpable acts will not slip
through the federal cracks. Only an integrated approach to proportionality, one that draws upon all aspects of criminal-law doctrine,
can be effective in restoring a long-overdue sense of moral proportion to federal criminal law and countering the steady drift of federalization toward broader liability rules and harsher penalties.
The following Sections present the various components of the integrated interpretive approach advocated here.
A. Proportionality-BasedApproaches to Statutory Construction
Courts should fundamentally rethink their current approach to
the interpretation of federal crimes. No longer should courts construe crimes broadly, without regard to the consequences of their
shown, federal and state prosecutors have a cooperative relationship in which they
decide, through negotiation, which cases "go federal" and which stay "stateside." See
generally Richman, supra note 36, at 92.
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decisions for proportionality of punishment. At a minimum, before
expanding the reach of a criminal statute, courts should consider
whether doing so will make it possible to impose disproportionate
punishment on blameworthy offenders. This inquiry will require
courts to look past the facts of the cases before them to hypothesize the range of potential applications of the statute,'2 paying close
attention to the penal consequences of an expansive interpretation.
Take federal mens rea doctrine first. The Supreme Court should
make clear that avoiding the conviction of morally blameless conduct is not the only goal of mens rea requirements. A separate,
equally vital goal is to ensure that the sanctions available in the
event of conviction will be proportional to the blameworthiness of
convicted offenders. Imposing punishment in excess of blameworthiness is just as offensive in principle as convicting blameless conduct: either way, courts are imposing punishment that is not justified by the culpability of the offender and gambling with the moral
credibility of the criminal law. Crimes for which Congress has prescribed severe penalties should require correspondingly high levels
of mens rea so that offenders will be seriously blameworthy and
thus morally deserving of stiff penalties.
Courts should also take proportionality into account when construing the actus reus of federal crimes. As with mens rea selection,
it is not enough to construe statutes narrowly when a broad interpretation might permit conviction of morally blameless conduct;
courts must also weigh the penal consequences of expanding the
statute. In the event that an expansive interpretation would
threaten to visit disproportionate punishment on convicted offenders, as determined against the baseline of other criminal laws (state
or federal) proscribing the same criminal act, a narrow reading is
the appropriate response unless the plain meaning of the statute
commands a broader interpretation. More specifically, before expanding an ambiguous statute to encompass 2a criminal act punished by other criminal laws of the same type, courts should con" This hypothetical inquiry is exactly how the Supreme Court decides federal mens
rea issues. See Wiley, supra note 4, at 1023 (explaining that courts deciding such issues
start by asking "as a hypothetical matter whether morally blameless people could [be
convicted]" on the government's interpretation).
an important
29The requirement that overlapping statutes be "of the same type" is
limitation because it ensures that the penal comparison will be appropriate. In the ex-
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sider whether the maximum penalties authorized by the statute are
significantly higher than the penalties that would otherwise apply
to that act under other federal statutes or, in cases that otherwise
could not be prosecuted federally, state law. If they are, the statute
should be narrowly interpreted so that the criminal act is subject to
more appropriate levels of punishment under other statutes.30
To illustrate this approach, consider Scheidler v. National Or-

ganization for Women.'

Scheidler was a civil RICO suit filed by

abortion clinics and advocates of legalized abortion against abortion protesters who trespassed on clinic property and, in some
cases, destroyed clinic property in order to disrupt their business.
The case turned on whether interfering with the clinics' ability to
conduct their business constituted extortion, a RICO predicate offense, because it deprived the clinics of their "intangible right" to
conduct their business without outside interference. The Court offered a laundry list of reasons, including plain text and statutory
history, for holding that such conduct is not extortion, and so
Scheidler was one of the rare cases in which it should have been
clear from the statute that a broad interpretation was improper.
Predictably, not one of the Justices saw that proportionality was
a powerful independent basis for the Court's decision. While the
abortion clinics were trying to expand the concept of "extortion" to
cover disruptive abortion-clinic protests, Congress had responded
to the controversy by passing the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 ("FACE"). "2 Under FACE, abortion-protest
activities of the type at issue in Scheidler-which would have been
felonies punishable by up to twenty years in prison under the
Hobbs Act and criminal RICO violations had the abortion clinics

ample given earlier of a fatal beating, see supra Section Ill.B, the fact that a beating is
an assault would obviously not tell us what the punishment should be when it results
in death. The heightened punishment for a beating that causes a fatality is justified by
the fact that the victim died, and no rational legislature would grade a fatal beating
commensurately with assault.
"0Of course, to the extent that federal crimes unambiguously extend into areas traditionally regulated by state enforcers, as many federal gun and drug crimes do, there
will be little room for interpretation. Any defendants prosecuted under those statutes
will therefore be in federal court, not because of the interpretive strategies employed
by the courts, but rather because of legislative and prosecutorial choices.
1 537 U.S. 393 (2003).
13118 U.S.C. § 248 (2000).
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prevailed-were graded as misdemeanors or, in the case of repeat
offenses, minor felonies.133
Of the eight Justices in the majority, only Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg even thought the existence of FACE was relevant to the
issues raised in Scheidler. Nevertheless, even she misapprehended
the statute's relevance. In her view, FACE was relevant simply to
show that expanding the Hobbs Act was unnecessary to prevent
abortion protesters from slipping through the federal cracks.134 The
real relevance of FACE, however, is that Congress specifically addressed the activities that gave rise to the Scheidler litigation and
prescribed much lower penalties.
Under the approach suggested here, Scheidler would have been
an easy case even if the Hobbs Act did not so plainly defeat application of the statute to protest activities. To construe a felony statute to encompass conduct that Congress specifically graded as a
misdemeanor in another statute is bad enough. For a court to make
conduct that Congress declared a misdemeanor (or, at most, a minor felony) a felony punishable by a maximum of twenty years' imprisonment and a criminal RICO violation-as Justice Stevens
would have-would be nothing short of extraordinary. Given how
courts usually interpret federal statutes, that position would have
undoubtedly garnered more than a single vote had the statute not
been so clearly in favor of the defendants. Courts, therefore, must
be forced to pay attention to the effect their interpretation of statutes will have on the penal consequences facing defendants.
See id. § 248(b). The Justices also overlooked another compelling proportionality
argument. Part of the majority's statutory-history argument was that, under the New
York law on which the Hobbs Act was modeled, interfering with the operation of a
business would have constituted coercion, a crime distinct from extortion. Scheidler,
537 U.S. at 405. The Justices attributed no significance to the fact, noted in a footnote
quoting the New York statute, that coercion was merely a misdemeanor. Id. at 405
n.10.
"3See Scheidler, 537 U.S. at 411 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("Congress crafted a
statutory response that homes in on the problem of criminal activity at health care facilities. Thus, the principal effect of a decision against petitioners here would have
been on other cases pursued under RICO." (citations omitted)). Notice (1) her implicit assumption that there had to be a remedy within federal criminal law for protest
activities even though trespassing, breaking and entering, and property destruction
are crimes in every state of the union, and (2) her implicit suggestion that the absence
of such a remedy in federal law might have warranted expanding the Hobbs Act to
cover such activities.
133
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B. From Severity Back to Lenity
That the federal courts are so often oblivious to the penal consequences of their interpretive decisions has important implications
for the venerable, if beleaguered, rule of lenity. The rule of lenity
has the distinction of being one of the few doctrines of the Marshall Court 135 that has not achieved canonical status. Several noted
scholars have forcefully argued in recent years that the rule should
be abolished. 36'
This Article suggests several potential new defenses for a
reinvigorated rule of lenity. First, given that the erosion of lenity
has resulted in what is effectively a rule of severity, it is far from
clear that a neutral approach to the interpretation of criminal
statutes is a realistic option. If rejecting lenity is equivalent to
endorsing severity, then, unless one is prepared to sacrifice
proportionality limits on punishment, the rule of lenity must not
only be preserved but reinvigorated. Second, the track record of
the courts in taking a federalized system of crime and making it
broader and more punitive undermines the assumption made by
lenity's critics that courts can reliably discern when criminal
statutes should be narrowly construed. There is every reason to
believe that courts will consistently get that determination wrong
when the conduct in question is morally blameworthy. In light of
these points, the time has come to rethink recent critiques of the
rule of lenity and to appreciate the important role it can play in
countering the senseless severity and breadth that is so
characteristic of federalization.
1. In Practice,Rejecting Lenity is Tantamount to Endorsing Severity
The critics of lenity rightly reject the notion that federal criminal
statutes should always be broadly construed and stress that a narrow interpretation will often be the right result. Kahan, for example, asserts that "federal criminal statutes should not uniformly be
read either narrowly or broadly, but rather appropriately so as to
carry out their purposes and to realize the full range of benefits as-

,3See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820).
'36John Jeffries and Dan Kahan are the leading proponents of this view. See
Jeffries, supra note 117, at 189; Kahan, supra note 120, at 425.
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sociated with delegated lawmaking." '37 The obvious assumption is
that there is a viable interpretive middle ground between the lenity
side of the spectrum (at which ambiguous statutes are narrowly
construed) and the anti-lenity or severity side of the spectrum (at
which such statutes are broadly construed).'38 The middle ground
for which critics of lenity aim is the following: statutes can be either
broadly or narrowly construed depending on judicial balancing of
the relevant policy considerations.
This middle ground may be attractive in theory, but it is evanescent at best in the real world in which courts operate. Given how
often courts interpret criminal statutes expansively, it should be
clear that courts do not simply let the weights in the policy scales
determine whether statutes are to be read broadly or narrowly. Instead, the balance is heavily skewed in favor of the prosecution
when the conduct in question is morally blameworthy, even when

37

' Kahan, supra note 120, at 426. Jeffries similarly argues that, although the rule of
lenity is "simplistic and wrong," there are three situations in which criminal statutes
should be narrowly construed: when the interpretation sought by the prosecutor (1)
would not be "consistent with legislative choice, either express or implied," (2) would
"threaten unfair surprise," or (3) would "create[] or perpetuate[] openendedness in
the criminal law." Jeffries, supra note 117, at 219, 220-21; see also Kahan, supra note
120, at 415 (identifying situations in which statutes should be narrowly interpreted).
"'The distance between the two sides of the spectrum will vary depending on
whether one adopts the strong or weak version of lenity. Under the strong version of
lenity, the defendant wins unless the statutory text clearly says otherwise; that is,
whenever there is any degree of ambiguity in a criminal statute, the court will resolve
it against the prosecution. This version of lenity "embodies 'the instinctive distaste
against men languishing in prisn unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should."'
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in Benchmarks 196, 209 (1967)). Under the
weak version of lenity, however, the defendant does not necessarily win upon demonstrating that the statute is ambiguous. The critical question is whether the text is sufficiently ambiguous to justify resort to lenity. If the government's reading is markedly
better in light of statutory text or structure than the defendant's, then the government's interpretation should be adopted; otherwise, the defendant wins. In cases
reading criminal statutes broadly, the Court has articulated an even weaker version of
lenity under which lenity is "reserved... for those situations in which a reasonable
doubt persists about a statute's intended scope even after resort to 'the language and
structure, legislative history, and motivating policies' of the statute." Moskal v. United
States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (quoting Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387
(1980)). This version of lenity is so weak that it is better viewed, in my opinion, as an
anti-lenity rule. As Kahan says, "[r]anking lenity 'last' among interpretive conventions all but guarantees its irrelevance." Kahan, supra note 120, at 386. My defense of
lenity is limited to the weaker version described above.
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the consequence of a broad interpretation is to allow prosecutors
to drive up considerably the punishment that would otherwise apply. Whether the law-enforcement need for expanded authority is
real'39 or imagined,'" the one constant seems to be that courts will
go to almost any lengths to keep blameworthy conduct from slipping through the cracks of federal criminal law and, indeed, of particular federal statutes. Thus, it is closer to the truth to say that the
operative interpretive rule in federal criminal cases is severity: that
ambiguous statutes presumptively should be broadly construed to
prevent culpable defendants from slipping through the federal
cracks.
This result should not be surprising. If indeed, as the critics of
lenity argue, the problem with taking the rule of lenity seriously is
that it "would render federal criminal statutes systematically underinclusive, ''.then it is to be expected that judges would rarely
see any reason to construe a statute narrowly when culpable conduct is at stake. To be sure, the potential for disproportionate punishment is a reason to interpret a criminal statute narrowly even
when the conduct in question is morally blameworthy. As this Ar-

"' See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981). See generally supra
notes 78-85 and accompanying text (discussing implications of Turkette for the fight
against organized crime).
0Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993), is a case in point. There, the defendant sought to trade a machine gun for drugs. He was convicted of multiple drug offenses, and presumably could have been convicted of any number of serious firearms
offenses as well. Suffice it to say that there was no danger that he or others who purchase drugs with guns (much less machine guns) would slip through the federal cracks.
The prosecutor, however, argued that exchanging guns for drugs constitutes "use" of
a firearm "during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime" pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1) (2000). Smith, 508 U.S. at 226. One would think that such barter is not a
terribly significant problem: even if trading guns for drugs is common, it would surely
be the rare drug dealer whose access to firearms depends on bartering customers. The
whole point of § 924(c) is that drug dealers are armed and highly dangerous. See
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 132 (1998) (describing the law as "an effort
to combat the 'dangerous combination' of 'drugs and guns'".). Nevertheless, Smith rejected the ordinary meaning of "using a gun" (which connotes employing the gun as a
weapon) and endorsed the "universal view of the courts of appeals" that the statute
encompasses barter with guns. Smith, 508 U.S. at 233. That the Court stretched the
statute to convict is all the more remarkable given the draconian penal consequences
of its interpretation: for having bartered with a machine gun, Smith faced a mandatory minimum sentence of thirty years, to run consecutively with his underlying drug
convictions. Id. at 227.
"' Kahan, supra note 120, at 409.
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ticle has shown, however, courts are blinded to the penal consequences of their interpretive decisions by culpability considerations.
Disregarding penal consequences leads more or less ineluctably
to a broad-construction rule when morally culpable conduct is at
stake. In such cases, there will be no risk of "unfair surprise": societal expectations about the types of activities that are morally acceptable or lawful will have afforded ample notice that the defendant should not have acted as he did. Typically, broadly construing
a statute does not result in what Jeffries calls "openendedness in
the criminal law" but rather in an ascertainable rule of conduct that
is broad in reach.4 2
Even when a broad interpretation would produce an openended crime and the attendant risks of prosecutorial abuse and
disproportionate punishment, courts still start from the premise
that for every crime of any consequence there must be a remedy
(or multiple remedies) in federal criminal law. This premise predictably leads courts to view openendedness in crimes as a price
well worth paying to ensure that culpable offenders will not escape
conviction in federal court.143 In practice, then, rejecting the rule of
lenity tends to look a lot like endorsing anti-lenity (or a rule of severity), and that affords a substantial justification for taking lenity
seriously even if an evenhanded approach to the interpretation of
criminal statutes might otherwise be preferable to a strictconstruction default.1"
,4'For example, although the Court expansively construed the phrase "use of a firearm" in Smith, the law was just broader, not open-ended: any active use of a firearm,
whether as a weapon, a commodity of exchange, or otherwise, counted. The breadth
of the definition of "use" did not mean that the concept was limitless. See Bailey v.
United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995) (holding that storing a gun near drugs does not
constitute "use" of a firearm). The paradigmatic example of an open-ended crime resulting from expansive judicial interpretation is mail and wire fraud. See Jeffries, supra note 117, at 239-42; see also supra Section III.B.3.
143For proof, one need look no farther than mail and wire fraud. Courts have
cut the
concept of "fraud" loose from preexisting notions of fraud and allowed prosecutors to
substitute in its place all sorts of imaginative "intangible rights." The result has been
federal prosecution of a dizzying array of misbehavior involving conflicts of interest,
ethical lapses, and violations of workplace rules. See supra notes 57 & 121. To his
credit, Jeffries condemns the courts' approach to mail and wire fraud. Jeffries, supra
note 117, at 239-42.
'"A strict-construction default can also be seen as consistent with congressional intent. Congress has opted out of lenity only in a few instances, usually in statutes au-
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2. Courts Consistently Failto Construe CriminalStatutes Narrowly
to Avoid DramaticIncreases in Punishment
The second potential new defense of lenity suggested by this Article arises from the first. The critics of lenity necessarily assume
that courts can reliably determine when it is appropriate to construe a criminal statute broadly and when a narrow construction is
appropriate."' Given the actual record of the courts in construing
federal crimes, however, this assumption is, at best, dubious and, at

worst, contrary to fact. Time and again, courts have construed federal crimes in ways that dramatically increase the punishment for
criminal behavior above and beyond the usual punishment for that
behavior under other federal criminal statutes or state law. The result is anything but sensible.
Two examples previously discussed illustrate the point. Prosecuting bribery under federal statutes specifically targeting bribery results in a penalty Congress deemed appropriate for bribery, but
prosecuting that same act as "extortion" under the Hobbs Act results in up to double the maximum punishment.'46 If a stick-up man
and his getaway-car driver conspire to commit a couple of bank
heists, whether they face the ordinary five-year penalty for conspiracy or the twenty-year penalty for "racketeering" under RICO
depends entirely on how the Department of Justice chooses to pro-

ceed."' Given that courts so often miss valid reasons for narrowly
construing statutes, a consistently applied rule of lenity, under
which every ambiguous criminal statute is read in favor of the defendant, begins to look much more attractive than the status quo.
thorizing forfeiture of proceeds of illegal activity. See Kahan, supra note 120, at 382
n.180. Congress thus is aware of the rule of lenity and knows how to opt out of it
when it wishes to do so. The only logical conclusion is that, by not doing so in the context of other crimes, Congress accepts the possibility that lenity might result in a narrow construction in future cases. The fact that Congress almost never opts out of lenity (and, as explained below, see infra note 160 and accompanying text, lets stand
most decisions narrowing federal crimes) undermines the assumption of lenity's critics
that Congress always wants broad criminal rules skewed in favor of the government.
'4 Jeffries, for example, says that, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute,
courts should weigh the advantages and disadvantages of a broad interpretation and
"do whatever seems right" in the circumstances. Jeffries, supra note 117, at 221; see
also Kahan, supra note 120, at 426 (arguing that statutes should be construed "appropriately" in light of their purposes).
,46See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 82-84
and accompanying text.
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Reconceptualizing the rule of lenity as a check on disproportionate criminal penalties in the federal system, as suggested here,
would restore the doctrine to a solid foundation in the policies that
gave rise to its creation in early English common law. The English
courts created the rule of lenity to ameliorate what Jeffries rightly
terms the "legislative blood lust of eighteenth-century England."'"
At that time, almost all felonies were capital offenses, and because
judges lacked discretion to sentence persons convicted of such
felonies to any penalty other than death, the rule of lenity was essential to counteract the "unmitigated severity" of criminal sanc' Unlike contemporary federal judges, their English forbears
tions. 49
understood all too well the importance of paying close attention to
the penal consequences of their interpretive decisions. The English
judges also understood, as their modem counterparts on the federal bench do not, that proportionality of punishment is no less essential to the just imposition of punishment than the presence of
moral blameworthiness. This is why the English courts adopted interpretive strategies that would mitigate, not exacerbate, the severity of the criminal sanctions that had been authorized by Parliament.
Today, although mandatory capital punishment is a thing of the
past, unwarranted severity in penal sanctions and limited sentencing discretion are as characteristic of contemporary federal criminal practice as they were of its antecedent in English common law.
Legislatively mandated minimum sentences, rigid federal sentencing guidelines recognizing only a small number of grounds for
downward departures, the abolition of parole for federal prison-

48
Jeffries, supra note 117, at 198.
"' Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 Harv. L. Rev.

'

748, 750 (1935). The rule of lenity, though originally one of several means of averting
unjust executions, became increasingly important as Parliament passed statutes making particular felonies "nonclergyable." Benefit of clergy, a judicial doctrine which
spared convicted felons of the death penalty if they could pass a literacy test (something that, in the Middle Ages, few people other than clergy could do), had been an
early effort to limit capital punishment. Parliament, however, started abrogating the
doctrine as "the growing literacy among laymen in the latter part of the 14th century
made a considerable number of them eligible to claim it." Id. at 749. The abrogation
of benefit of clergy made lenity even more essential to counteract excessive reliance
on capital punishment, a problem Parliament did not address until the nineteenth century when the death penalty ceased to be the usual penalty for felonies. Id. at 751.
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ers, 150 and ever-increasing statutory maximums make this abundantly clear. Now, factor in the ways courts unwittingly yet unmistakably make federal criminal sanctions even harsher: they broadly
construe federal crimes (thereby empowering prosecutors to shift
defendants from the more lenient state system into federal court
and drive up the penalties available in federal court) and allow
prosecutors to pick and choose among overlapping statutes carrying different penalties. Consequently, the rule of lenity remains
necessary today as a mechanism for mitigating the severity of existing criminal sanctions.
3. Taking Lenity Seriously Would Help Counteract
DisproportionateFederalPenalties
Any real-world justification for lenity, such as the ones offered
above, must address Professor William Stuntz's recent critique of
the rule of lenity. Unlike Jeffries and Kahan, Stuntz does not attack lenity on theoretical grounds; instead, he argues that taking
lenity seriously would be pointless given what he calls the "deep
politics" of federal criminal law. 5' In his view, if courts enforced
the rule of lenity, Congress would respond by writing clearer and
broader criminal statutes and by overruling decisions that narrowly
interpret criminal statutes. "2 Stuntz deserves credit for asking the
right question. The question is not whether, as an abstract matter,
lenity or some other interpretive posture is the right one; it is,
rather, what interpretive strategy makes the most sense in our current federalized system of crime.
Although Stuntz asks the right question, his answer is unconvincing. On the first point, lenity need not lead to any change in
how Congress defines many crimes. As Stuntz says elsewhere in his
fascinating article on the political economy of criminal law, many
federal crimes are "symbolic" only and "generate very few federal
5 3 For such crimes,
prosecutions.""
the rule of lenity should have no
effect on legislative draftsmanship: the symbolic statement is made,
legislators can take credit for being "tough" on crime, and they can
"0See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (2000).
5,Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 2, at 510.
152 Id. at 561-65.
"' Id. at 546.
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move on to other kinds of rent-seeking with higher potential payoffs. Even for crimes that are likely to be prosecuted frequently, a
strategy of anticipating and resolving interpretive questions in favor of the government will often, in practice, be ineffective. The
problem of ambiguity in criminal statutes is not just inartful crime
definition (although that assuredly is a problem), but also that it
can be difficult to foresee the many interpretive questions that will
arise in real-world prosecutions.
Consider, for example, RICO. RICO was the product of an unusually deliberative, years-long effort by Congress, in close cooperation with the Department of Justice, to craft an innovative remedy against organized crime. At the conclusion of this historic
effort, Congress enacted a statute premised on an approach (striking at racketeers when they infiltrate businesses and other legitimate "enterprises") that, within a few short years, was all but
abandoned by federal prosecutors in favor of an entirely unforeseen approach (using RICO against mafia families and other
purely illegitimate "enterprises").'" If Congress does such a poor
job at predicting the future when, as in the case of RICO, it really
matters and Congress is actually trying to get the policy right (instead of just making symbolic statements for reelection campaigns), there is little room for confidence that Congress could,
even if it wanted to, anticipate and address (in clear and unambiguous terms, no less) many future interpretive questions when enacting a new crime."
See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
might argue that the difficulty of greater ex ante specificity in defining
crimes cuts in favor of allowing Congress to delegate crime-definition power to the
courts. See Kahan, supra note 120. The problem with this argument is that it ignores
the context in which interpretive questions arise in federal criminal cases. Given the
breadth and redundancy of the federal criminal code, the risk of any nontrivial criminal behavior completely evading federal prosecution is remote. Almost invariably, the
question is not whether such behavior can be prosecuted federally, but rather just
how many different statutes it can be prosecuted under and how stiff the penalty will
be upon conviction. The danger that federal criminal statutes might not reach any
substantial crime is thus small. (This may explain why Congress has opted out of the
rule of lenity in only a few instances. See supra note 144.) The danger melts completely away when the two-tiered structure of the American criminal justice system is
taken into account. Federal criminal law is not the sole, or even major, line of defense
in the fight against crime; state criminal law is. It is significant that many states have
rejected the rule of lenity, thereby allowing their courts to expand state crimes where
necessary to catch criminals who might otherwise escape punishment. See generally
155One
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In any case, more specificity up front might not be the disaster
that Stuntz fears, for it might actually lead to less criminalization
rather than more. Take, for example, the Mann Act.156 If Congress
had been forced to replace the vague catch-all provision criminalizing interstate transportation for "any... immoral purpose' ' 1 7 with
specific language giving notice that the bill would literally make
felons of unfaithful spouses and teenagers who "go too far" on a
date, it is not at all clear that the bill would have passed. After all,
the legislation was packaged, intentionally and perhaps deceptively, as a measure aimed only at forcible "trafficking" in females.'
In this connection, note that in 1948 Congress repealed the federal enclave statutes that specifically criminalized adultery and fornication, but left the Mann Act, which covered the same behavior
not just on federal enclaves but nationwide, unchanged until the
' Why
1980s. 59
the difference? A plausible explanation would seem
to be that, although Congress intended to decriminalize adultery
and fornication back in the 1940s, it overlooked the fact that the
Mann Act covered that same behavior because the Act referred
vaguely to "white slavery" and transportation for "any... immoral
Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 885,
902-03 (2004). Even in states where lenity is formally the rule, "rigorous applications
of lenity are extremely rare." Id. at 901. The widespread abolition of lenity at the state
level bolsters the case for adhering to lenity at the federal level. A consistently applied federal rule of lenity would prevent federal courts from worsening the problem
of disproportionately harsh federal punishments without any risk that culpable persons will escape the punishment they deserve. To the extent that taking lenity seriously at the federal level would allow some culpable offenders to escape conviction in
federal court (which is hard to imagine given the scope and redundancy of the federal
code), state criminal law would be available as a fall-back, especially in states that do
not strictly follow lenity. It is hard enough to conceive of a nontrivial culpable act that
federal criminal law does not reach; it borders on the impossible to think of such conduct that would slip through the cracks of both federal and state criminal law.
116Mann Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2421 (2000).
157Id.
158 See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. The packaging
may have been
deceptive because, after reviewing the decision in Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470 (1917), Congressman Mann wrote the author of the majority opinion congratulating him for "constru[ing] the law the way I intended" and stating that, despite the
statements of limited purpose in the House committee report (which the Caminetti
dissent had stressed), "I explained to a good many Members the bill as going fully as
far as is stated in your valuable opinion." Langum, supra note 45, at 119.
151See supra
note 46.
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purpose" instead of adultery and fornication specifically. This
would suggest that, in some contexts, specific language apprising
members of Congress precisely what they are criminalizing may
lead to less criminalization.
As for the point about overrulings, Stuntz's argument proves too
much: if he is right that lenity is pointless because of the likelihood
of legislative overrides, then any effort to construe crimes narrowly
is pointless. In that case, his claim ought to be that courts should
always construe crimes broadly, a position that, sensibly, neither he
nor lenity's critics take. The more fundamental response is that, although narrow interpretations are surely more likely to be overruled than interpretations favoring the government, most decisions
narrowly interpreting criminal statutes are not in fact overruled. As
Stuntz himself notes: "[B]etween 1978 and 1984, the Supreme
Court decided thirty-four cases interpreting criminal statutes unfavorably to criminal defendants. Congress overturned only one of
those cases. Meanwhile, during the same period, Congress overturned five of twenty-four decisions unfavorable to the federal
government."'" These data indicate that close to eighty percent of
the narrow interpretations surveyed were not overruled.
This is cause for optimism, not pessimism, about the potential
for lenity to avoid disproportionate penalties and make serious inroads on federalization. The data suggest that legislative inertia, if
nothing else, will preserve many of the gains produced by narrow
interpretations, and those gains (unlike the gains from broad interpretations) are ones that, no matter how sensible, the legislative
process cannot be counted upon to deliver. With those odds, lenity
is a good bet-one well worth taking to counteract the potential
that broad interpretations of federal statutes will dramatically in-

Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 2, at 562 n.214 (citations omitted). See
generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 Yale L.J. 331, 344 tbl.4, 345 (1991). The data show, as theory
would predict, that the Department of Justice is the party in the best position to overcome legislative inertia and obtain congressional clarification of ambiguities in criminal statutes. The rule of lenity-which, functionally speaking, puts the burden on the
Justice Department to get clarifying legislation from Congress-thus is the sensible
response to the political economy of federal criminal law. For an excellent argument
along these lines, see Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules,
102 Colum. L. Rev. 2162, 2194 (2002).
'60
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crease the penalties federal defendants will face and to prevent
courts from worsening the problem of federalization.
C. Statutory Exclusivity
The reforms discussed above all address the common situation in
which federal criminal statutes are ambiguous and thus, as a textual
matter, can reasonably be read either broadly or narrowly. These
interpretive strategies, functionally speaking, serve as clearstatement rules requiring Congress to make clear when it intends
to drive up the penalty for crimes that otherwise receive lesser punishment or to expand the reach of particular crimes. Congress
would thus retain ultimate control over the definition of federal
crimes and over how severely they are punished.
One additional reform is necessary to address the situation in
which a number of overlapping statutes apply to the same basic
crime: making specific criminal statutes addressing the same crime
exclusive of more general statutes. The problem here is not that
the statutes are ambiguous; it is that a number of statutes apply to
same criminal act. The example given earlier was fraud, 16 but the
point is easily generalizable: When multiple criminal laws regulate
the same criminal act but provide different penalties or define the
crime differently, allowing prosecutors to pick and choose among
the statutes as they see fit allows them to override legislative policy
choices concerning crime definition and the proper penalty for a
criminal act.
This problem can and should be solved by adopting a principle
of statutory exclusivity to address the redundancy of the federal
code. Under this approach, when multiple statutes of the same type
apply to the same act or omission, 62 prosecutors would be required
to proceed under the most specific statute applicable to that act to
the exclusion of more general crimes.' This would be so even if it
161

See supra Section III.B.3.

162For the implications of the "same type" limitation, see supra note 129.
161This approach would be justified by a longstanding principle of statutory interpretation: "As always, '[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute
will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of the
enactment."' Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426
U.S. 148, 153 (1976)). This principle is consistent with two analogous holdings that
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means that the prosecution would fail because of how Congress defined the most specific crime.
To illustrate how the exclusivity approach would work, consider
a prosecution involving the fraudulent use of credit cards. Although mail and wire fraud could, as a literal matter, apply, the
credit-card fraud statute would be the more specific statute because it applies to a subset of frauds orchestrated through the use
of the mails and wires-namely, frauds involving credit cards. Consequently, the credit-card fraud statute would be the exclusive basis for prosecuting that act. This would cut in half the maximum
punishment of twenty years for mail and wire fraud."
Notice that if the amount of the fraud were below the monetary
threshold specified in the credit-card statute, no federal fraud statute could be used because the prosecutor would be limited to the
credit-card statute yet unable to prove a necessary element for
conviction under that statute. In that event, the prosecutor would
have two choices: either charge the defendant for a different criminal act or omission (assuming there is one), or leave the defendant
to potential prosecution in state court. As this example demonstrates, an exclusivity approach would prevent federal prosecutors
from using charge-selection to evade congressional policy choices
about the definition of federal crimes or to drive up the maximum
generic remedies for civil-rights violations are exclusive of more specific statutory
remedies. In Preiserv. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), the Court held that the federal
cause of action against state actors for infringements of federally guaranteed rights, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, cannot be used by state prisoners to obtain release from imprisonment
in lieu of the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2266. Despite the "literal applicability" of § 1983, the Court ruled that the habeas statute "must be understood to be the exclusive remedy" for state prisoners challenging the fact or duration
of their incarceration. Preiser,411 U.S. at 489. Otherwise, prisoners could, simply by
suing under § 1983 instead of the habeas statute, evade the express statutory requirement that habeas petitioners must exhaust available state-court remedies before challenging their convictions in federal court. To the same effect is GreatAm. Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979). That case involved an attempt by a Title
VII claimant to evade the limitations on damages and mediation requirements applicable to Title VII suits. Instead of suing under Title VII, the plaintiff asserted the substantive antidiscrimination rights conferred by Title VII through the remedial apparatus of a companion statute to § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Novotny held that Title VII
was the exclusive remedy for enforcing rights conferred by Title VII because resort to
§ 1985(3), if allowed, would empower Title VII plaintiffs to "avoid most if not all of
theJ] detailed and specific provisions" of Title VII. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 375-76.
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1644 (2000) (credit-card fraud) with 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343
(Supp. 2002) (mail and wire fraud, respectively).

946

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 91:879

punishment above the level Congress prescribed in the most specific applicable statute. 65
In many cases, the exclusivity approach will result in a lower
maximum penalty, sometimes even a dramatically lower penalty.
As an example, requiring prosecutors to use the federal-official extortion statute instead of the Hobbs Act when prosecuting a federal employee for official-right extortion would lower the available
punishment from a maximum of twenty years to three. '66 It is important to note, however, that exclusivity will not invariably result
in lesser punishment. Where the crimes carry the same maximum
punishment, the choice as to which crime to charge may make no
difference to the sentence the defendant faces. This would be the
case, for instance, if either mail and wire fraud or securities fraud
were used to prosecute fraud in the purchase or sale of securities,
because7 both sets of fraud statutes carry maximums of twenty
16
years.

'65 Cases may arise in which it is unclear which of two potentially applicable
crimes
of the same type is the more specific. When it is unclear which statute should be the
exclusive remedy, it makes sense to err on the side of caution and require use of the
statute carrying the lower penalty. To be sure, this tie-breaker rule resolves ambiguous cases according to a substantive bias (avoiding potentially disproportionate punishment), but that is unexceptional. Many recognized interpretive canons do precisely
that. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., et al., Cases and Materials on Legislation:
Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 848-908 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing the rule
of lenity and other examples). For an overview of the normative debate over substantive canons, see id. at 914-16.
'66Compare 18 U.S.C. § 872 (2000) (federal-official extortion), with id. § 1951
(Hobbs Act). Section 872 is the more specific statute because it applies only to one
kind of extortion (extortion under color of public office) by one kind of officeholder
(federal officials), whereas the Hobbs Act applies to any kind of extortion (by means
of public office or of wrongful force, violence, or fear) by any public official (federal,
state, or local) and, in the case of official-right extortion, private individuals acting
under pretense of public office. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Similarly,
disallowing use of mail and wire fraud to punish violations of the False Claims Act
would lower the maximum penalty from twenty years to five. See 18 U.S.C. § 287. The
Act is the more specific crime because it applies to a particular subset of potential
fraud victims (federal agencies) and to one particular way of defrauding federal agencies (submitting false claims for payment). Finally, if remitted to the health-care fraud
statute instead of mail and wire fraud, for example, the maximum penalty drops from
twenty years to ten. See id. § 1347 (health-care fraud). Section 1347 is more specific
than mail or wire fraud because it applies only to fraudulent activity aimed at a
particular class of victims (federal health-care agencies).
67Even when the choice between two crimes does not affect the maximum sentence, it may nevertheless have a significant effect on the potential sentence. If two
crimes carry the same maximum punishment but one of them has a mandatory mini-
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In some cases, however, exclusivity will actually require the
prosecutor to use the statute carrying the higher punishment. For
example, if a defendant mails in a materially false credit application to a federally insured bank, the bank-fraud statute would be
the most specific statute as compared to mail or wire fraud. Bank
fraud, however, is punishable by up to thirty years in prison versus
the twenty-year maximum for mail and wire fraud."
The fact that, in cases such as these, an exclusivity approach will
not produce lower sentences is not problematic from the perspective of avoiding disproportionately severe punishment. In many
such cases, there is no lessening of potential punishment, but, at
the same time, there is no increase either; the exposure of defendants in such cases is the same under an exclusivity approach as
under current law. Though exclusivity produces no proportionality
gain (or loss) in these situations, in many other situations it will
substantially lower the penalty the defendant faces by remitting
prosecutors to statutes under which Congress prescribed lesser
penalties. Furthermore, in cases such as the earlier example of
credit-card fraud below the prescribed monetary threshold, where
limitations in the definition of the most specific statute preclude
federal conviction, exclusivity would mean that the criminal act
could only be prosecuted in state court, where more lenient and
more flexible sentencing policies typically apply.169 As a whole,
then, defendants would be much better off under the exclusivity
approach than under current law.

mum sentence, the statute carrying the mandatory minimum may well produce the
harsher sentence. This can even happen when the statute to which the mandatory
minimum applies carries a lower maximum than the other statute. It is for these reasons that the Ashcroft memorandum's requirement that prosecutors proceed under
the statute carrying the highest potential penalty recognizes an exception for cases in
which statutes with lower maximum penalties would generate the highest sentence
due to a mandatory minimum. See Ashcroft Memo, supra note 70, at 2.
" Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (Supp. 2002) (bank fraud), with id. §§ 1341, 1343 (mail
and wire fraud, respectively). Also, a number of crimes, such as RICO, contain their
own conspiracy prohibitions, which are punished more severely than the five years
authorized under the general conspiracy statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2000) (providing twenty-year penalty for conspiracies to violate RICO). These conspiracy provisions, though more severe, would be more specific than the general conspiracy statute
under the exclusivity approach.
and would thus govern
"9See supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.

948

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 91:879

More fundamentally, the approach outlined in this Article does

not presume, in cases of overlapping statutes carrying different

penalties, that the lower penalty is invariably "right" and the

higher one "wrong." There would be no basis for such a presump-

tion. The presumption instead is that the more specific the crime is,
the more likely it is that the legislature understood the range of
behaviors that it was criminalizing and thus that the punishment
the legislature prescribed will be proportional to those behaviors.
The risk of disproportionate punishment is at its greatest when a

statute covers a wide range of behavior of differing levels of culpa-

bility and behavior that is poorly defined. In those situations, the
legislature may well prescribe a stiff penalty that, although appropriate for more culpable kinds of behavior covered by the statute,
may well be excessive as to other kinds of behavior that is less evidently covered or that is covered only because of later expansive
interpretations by courts. 17' The contention here is that the goal of
proportionality in punishment is best served overall by requiring
prosecutors to proceed under the most specific applicable statute
even if that statute may, in certain contexts, carry a severe penalty.
After all, serious crimes should carry severe penalties. The objection is not to severe penalties but rather to disproportionately severe penalties-penalties in excess of the blameworthiness of the

170 Consider the 2002 increase of the penalties
for mail and wire fraud from five to
twenty years. The stated motivation for the increases was the corporate accounting
scandals that rocked Wall Street over the past few years, driving even Fortune 500
companies into bankruptcy and costing thousands of employees their jobs. The paradigm Congress had in mind in quadrupling the punishment for mail and wire fraud
was massive, sophisticated frauds like Enron. Because use of mail and wire facilities is
ubiquitous and prosecutors are free under current law to pick and choose among applicable statutes as they see fit, the huge increase in the penalty for mail and wire
fraud does not simply increase the penalty for massive corporate frauds; it essentially
makes the maximum punishment for every fraud that can be prosecuted federally
at
least twenty years. Similarly, the twenty-year maximum for robbery and extortion under the Hobbs Act makes sense when the paradigm is the use of violence or other seriously wrongful means to force people to surrender their money or property; it made
far less sense when the meaning of "extortion" was stretched decades later to include
bribery (a serious but less severely punished crime), and no sense whatsoever when
applied to the minor felony of illegal-gratuities offenses. See supra Sections III.A.2,
III.B.3.
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criminal act, as measured by the penalties specified in the most
specific applicable statute.7'
CONCLUSION

Proportionality of punishment is in serious jeopardy in the federal system. Many scholars attribute the blame for that unjust state
of affairs, and for federalization more generally, to Congress.
Closer inspection, however, reveals a considerably different story,
one that is not so charitable to the judiciary. The federal courts are
not innocent bystanders watching helplessly as Congress and the
Department of Justice federalize crime and ratchet up punishments
for federal defendants. Instead, the courts have been playing the
federalization game right along with the political branchesunwittingly, perhaps, but playing all the same-by expansively construing federal crimes without regard to the penal consequences of
doing so. The federal criminal code is as broad and harsh as it is
today in large part because the federal courts helped make it that
way.
The approach the courts have taken in case after case is as predictable as its results have been misguided and, at times, tragic.
The courts are motivated by the view that their role is to ensure
that no defendant who has committed a morally blameworthy act
will slip through the federal cracks. As a result, courts have consistently construed criminal statutes expansively, extending both the
scope and the redundancy of the federal criminal code. By broadly
construing criminal statutes, the courts have allowed federal prosecutors to shift offenders who otherwise would have received more
lenient sentences in state court into the far more rigid and punitive
federal system. Moreover, the courts have allowed prosecutors to
treat the penalty prescribed in specific criminal statutes as merely
171This approach may be consistent with legislative intent. The power to pick and
choose among overlapping crimes empowers prosecutors to override one of the most
basic policy judgments that Congress makes when adding to the criminal code: the
extent of punishment that a criminal act deserves. When Congress assigns a penalty
for a particular criminal act, it presumably prescribes the full amount of the punishment it intends to authorize and thus implicitly decides that additional punishment is
not warranted. Having made that decision, it is far from self-evident that Congress
would want to allow prosecutors to use generic statutes carrying higher penalties to
drive up the punishment that Congress deemed appropriate for the precise act.
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an "opening bid" in an attempt to secure the highest possible sentence. By this I mean that even where a federal statute specifically
applies to a particular criminal act, the courts have often broadly,
construed more general overlapping statutes carrying higher penalties to encompass the act, thereby driving up the punishment that
Congress specifically prescribed for that act.
Through these means, the courts have achieved the protection
they (and prosecutors) wanted against culpable defendants slipping
through the federal cracks, but at a very high price indeed-both to
themselves and, more importantly, the people they imprison and
the families left behind. The courts have expanded the breadth and
depth of the federal criminal code and given prosecutors license to
exploit it as they see fit and to transform their local U.S. district
court into what one judge has aptly described as "a 'police court'
where judges are under 'constant pressure to keep cases moving as
fast as possible."'172 To make sure the blameworthy do not get
away, the courts have often allowed the guilty to be punished in
excess of blameworthiness and opened the floodgates to federal
criminal cases. Disproportionate punishment and crushing criminal
dockets are now a common feature of the federal criminal landscape, and relief is nowhere in sight.
Amazingly, given the widely recognized importance of proportionality in criminal law theory, there is virtually no protection under current law against disproportionately severe criminal penalties. At the front end of the criminal process, courts regularly
expand the reach of federal statutes and, in doing so, drive up the
penalties federal defendants face. At the back end of the process,
the federal sentencing guidelines and legislative mandatory minimum sentences take away any meaningful judicial sentencing discretion, which might otherwise be used to tailor the punishment to
"fit" the crime, and constitutional proportionality review is essentially an empty promise outside the capital context. There is, in
short, only one guaranteed pathway to leniency in the federal system these days, and that is to plead guilty-a state of affairs that
should be as troubling to us as it is pleasing to prosecutors.
Sanford H. Kadish, Comment, The Folly of Overfederalization, 46 Hastings L.J.
1247, 1250-51 (1995) (quoting remarks by Chief Judge Judith Keep of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California).
17
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Although proportionality may not be ideal as a constitutional
standard for terms of imprisonment, courts can and should use
statutory interpretation to avoid the potential for disproportional
federal sanctions. This Article has proposed several interpretive
strategies that would do so and, in the process, help counteract
federalization. If broadly interpreting an ambiguous statute would
significantly drive up the punishment for a criminal act, then that is
just as compelling a reason to read the statute narrowly as is the
potential for punishing blameless conduct. In cases where multiple
statutes clearly apply to the same criminal act-the paradigm here
is the multiplicity of federal fraud statutes-courts should require
prosecutors to proceed under the most specific applicable statute in
order to prevent prosecutors from exploiting the redundancy of the
federal criminal code to drive up the punishment Congress prescribed for the offense committed by the defendant. To the extent
courts continue to sacrifice proportionality concerns in order to ensure that blameworthy offenders do not slip through the federal
cracks, a consistently applied rule of lenity is the only realistic solution.
These solutions would go a long way toward promoting proportionality of punishment and counteracting the growing breadth and
depth of the federal criminal code. I harbor no illusion, however,
that they would completely solve the problems associated with federalization. A complete solution will ultimately depend on Congress exercising greater restraint in the use of its power to enact
crimes and showing greater respect for the primacy of the states in
fighting crime. Unless all that happens, we will necessarily be in a
second-best world (or worse). In my view, however, that world
need not be the rather bleak "world in which the law on the books
makes everyone a felon"'7 3 and prosecutorial decisions about who
goes to prison and for how long largely go unchecked.
If, indeed, we are on the way to that world-and, regrettably,
every indication is that we are-the federal courts cannot lay the
blame entirely at the doorstep of the other branches. The judiciary
bears a fair share of the blame for the interpretive strategies it employs in criminal cases. That is the bad news. The good news is that
if federal courts rediscover the virtues of narrowly construing

'73Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 2, at 511.

952

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 91:879

criminal statutes and, more generally, of firmly grounding criminal
punishment in moral blameworthiness, even a federalized system
of crime may not be so bad after all. If that prediction turns out to
be wrong, then the fault for the problems associated with federalization truly will lie elsewhere.

